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ABSTRACT
LOISE, THOMAS. Towards Security-aware Mutation Testing. (Under the direction of Patrick
Heymans.)
Mutation analysis forms a popular software analysis technique that has been demonstrated
to be useful in supporting multiple software engineering activities. Yet, the use of mutation
analysis in tackling security issues has received little attention. In view of this, we design se-
curity aware mutation operators to support mutation analysis. Using a known set of common
security vulnerability patterns, we introduce 15 security-aware mutation operators for Java.
We then implement them in the PIT mutation engine and evaluate them. Our preliminary
results demonstrate that standard PIT operators are unlikely to introduce vulnerabilities sim-
ilar to ours. We also show that our security-aware mutation operators are indeed applicable
and prevalent on open source projects, providing evidence that mutation analysis can support
security testing activities.
L’analyse de mutation est une technique d’analyse de logiciel qui a de´ja` de´montre´ son utilite´
dans plusieurs activite´s d’inge´nierie du logiciel. Cependant, l’analyse de mutation n’a e´te´ que
peu utilise´e dans le but de faire face aux proble`mes qui rele`vent de la cyber-se´curite´. Dans cette
optique, nous concevons des ope´rateurs de mutation sensibles a` la cyber-se´curite´, qui viendront
supporter l’analyse de mutation. En utilisant un ensemble connu de motifs de vulne´rabilite´s,
nous pre´sentons 15 ope´rateurs sensibles a` la cyber-se´curite´ pour le langage de programmation
Java. Ensuite, nous les imple´mentons dans le moteur de mutation PIT et nous les e´valuons. Nos
re´sultats pre´liminaires de´montrent qu’il est peu probable que les ope´rateurs standards de PIT
introduisent des vulne´rabilite´s similaires aux noˆtres. De plus, nous montrons que nos ope´rateurs
cyber-sensibles sont effectivement utilisables dans des projets open-source, ce qui prouve que
l’analyse de mutation peut supporter des activite´s de testing pour la cyber-se´curite´.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
In our world, a humongous amount of activities rely on IT. Hence, web-based services support
banks, web commerce, health organizations, and even governments activities. These web ap-
plications1 are supposed to be trustworthy. Hence, we cannot imagine to use a webapp for an
economical purpose without trust. However, studies and past exploits have demonstrated that
webapps are also prone to security issues. Therefore, security testing has been integrated in
the software development cycle, translating itself in various activities, specifically designed to
insure a given level of security for the application under development.
However, security can be viewed as a common non-functional requirement, and testing tech-
niques may be adapted in order to cover those requirements. In this context, we explore the
possibility of adapting mutation testing [9, 10], a popular fault-based testing technique, for
security requirements and at code level. As every fault-based technique, mutation testing pro-
vides guarantees that the software under analysis is free from specific types of faults [11]. Also,
the technique is known to form a flexible and effective way to perform testing, this last fact
explaining its popularity. Among others, mutation testing is used to guide test generation [12],
to perform test assessment [13] and to uncover subtle faults [14]. It works by generating syn-
tactically altered program versions of the system under test, called mutants. These alterations
substitute programmers faults [15] and therefore can be used to determine the adequacy of test
suites at detecting those faults. The method’s flexibility relies on the possibility of tuning the
introduced alterations [10] for specific kind of faults. Thus, mutation testing can be used for
almost every purpose testing aims at.
1We will use the equivalent term “webapps” for the remaining of the document.
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This last fact enables us to use mutation testing for security, as we may design alterations
specifically designed to introduce vulnerabilities. By taking advantage of the fault-based nature
of the technique, mutation testing may ensure that security-aware faults are not present in the
core of the system under test and, through regression tests, that these will not appear in its
future evolutions.
1.2 Research problem
There is a large diversity of different mutation operators sets, each specifically designed to guide
the tester in a precise context. Hence, among others, there are mutation operators for OO-
program testing [16], SQL database queries testing [17] and integration testing [18]. However,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no mutation operator set specifically designed for security
testing at code level. Therefore, we aim at addressing this research problem: May we design
security-aware mutation operators that are helpful in security testing for web applications?
As many webapps are implemented in JAVA, we focus on this programming language in our
research. In order to answer the problem, we will need to investigate to which extent traditional
mutation operators for JAVA are already suitable for security testing.
1.3 Overview of the approach
To address the research problem, we designed ourselves security-aware mutation operators, i.e,
mutation operators specifically designed to introduce security bugs in web applications. There-
fore, we took inspiration on common security bug patterns encoded by a well-known static
analysis tool called FindBugs-sec-plugin2 [19]. The bug patterns used by the static analysis
tools aim at identifying potential issues with the code under analysis. Therefore, they point-
out the presence of potential bugs and not opportunities for injecting them as it is done by
the mutation operators. To cover this last point and design our security-aware mutations, we
manually analyzed the bug patterns, inferred the classes of faults they represent and inverted
them, i.e., we defined rules that introduce these defects. We have implemented our mutations
in PIT, a popular mutation testing tool [3] and provide initial exploratory results showing their
applicability and difference from the traditional mutation operators. Thus, we applied both the
traditional and our operators on four subject programs and validated the presence of potential
vulnerabilities using FindBugs. Our results demonstrate that traditional operators are ineffec-
tive in introducing such security-aware faults.
2Find Security Bugs is a plugin for FindBugs that aims at identifying security issues in JAVA webapps.
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Overall, our security related faults represent simple vulnerabilities, which can form an initial
step for defining security-aware testing requirements. We believe that these requirements are
particularly useful when building regression test suites of webapps. Furthermore, our operators
can be particularly useful in evaluating and comparing fuzzing or other security testing tools.
In summary, our research makes the following contributions:
1. We design 15 security-aware mutation operators for supporting security mutation testing.
2. We extend PIT so that it applies both traditional and security-aware mutation testing.
To support future research, we make our implementation publicly available.
3. We make an initial assessment of our operators demonstrating their prevalence and the
potential weaknesses of the traditional operators using large real-world projects.
The major outcomes of the research exposed in this thesis were published [20] in Mu-
tation2017, the 12th in the series of international workshops focusing on mutation analysis
collocated with the international conference on software testing verification and validation that
was held in mid April in Tokyo this year. I had the opportunity to present these results at the
workshop. The published paper is attached to the thesis in the appendix section.
1.4 Thesis structure
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the background and concepts needed for
the understanding of the thesis. Chapter 3 exposes the state of the art in the research problem
we try to address. Chapter 4 answers partly to the research problem by stating the mutation
operators we propose. Chapter 5 details the research questions we formulate in order to answer
formally the research problem risen. Then, the chapter gives details of the experimentation
process and presents the case studies we analyzed. Chapter 5 also presents and discusses the
results we obtained. Finally, chapter 6 gives a conclusion and proposes perspectives to the
thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we present the concepts and theories needed for a good understanding of
the outcomes of this study. We begin with an introduction to testing, then follow with an
introduction to the mutation testing theory. We follow with the presentation of the mutation
testing tool that we used during our experimentation, PITest. Then, we give main concepts
of security testing also required for the understanding of the following chapters. Finally, we
present a security static analyzer that we used during our experimentation, FindBugs.
2.1 Software Testing
Software engineering, as every human activity, is prone to errors. These errors can be intro-
duced at any step of the software development life-cycle and can lead to software failures during
the operation of the system. Figure 2.1 summarizes the relations between errors, faults and
failures.Errors are made in the specification, design or coding activities. Those errors introduce
faults in the system, that can result in failures. Failures are observable wrong behaviors of the
software system. Faults are mistakes introduced in a software system.
Obviously, software should be free from faults. There are two ways to evaluate the cor-
rectness of software. One is empirical verification, which can guarantee the absence of faults
using theorem proving or model-checking techniques. Unfortunately, it is unpractical and in-
feasible for large cases to apply these methods because of the complexity of their associated
analyses. Thus, we recourse to software testing by exercising the software on finite domains of
inputs/outputs. Though non-exhaustive, software testing can flexibility accommodate limited
validation budgets.
4
Figure 2.1: The relation between errors, faults, and failures [1].
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Undoubtedly, the goal we just described is very abstract. Indeed, there are many questions
to be answered while designing tests: Which scenarios should I cover ? When do I have enough
tests ? Therefore, this goal should be rephrased in a more concrete and understandable target:
a coverage criterion.
A coverage criterion is a rule or a collection of rules guiding the test requirements design
process. A test requirement is a specific element of a software artifact that a test case must
cover or satisfy [10]. A test suite, a set of test cases, is therefore the product of satisfying
several test requirements. The process of software testing can be summarized by the following
activities.
1. Choose a coverage criterion.
2. Derive test requirements from the coverage criterion rules.
3. Satisfy the test requirements by implementing test cases, this giving a test suite.
Many coverage criteria exist. For instance, branch coverage’s satisfaction requires to cover
all possible decisions in a program, statement coverage’s satisfaction requires to cover all the
statements of the program under test. Criteria define the efforts to be provided in order to
assess the partial absence of faults in the software. Moreover, some criteria are stronger than
others, providing more complete fault test suites, by costs of efforts in the number of test cases
to provide. Indeed, a criterion can be proven harder to satisfy than another, using the sub-
suming relation. Formally, given C1 and C2, two coverage criteria, C1 subsumes C2 if and
only if every test set that satisfies C1 also satisfies C2 [10].
Software testing is usually performed to assess the functional behavior of a system but it
can also be used for testing non functional requirements such as security or the performance of
the system under test1. Also, testing can be performed at different levels of granularity. One
can test a complete system whereas it can also test each component or class individually. In
every case, the key aspect of testing is the choice of a coverage criterion. Mutation testing,
as any testing technique, presents one of these criteria. We note that mutation testing can be
used at every level of granularity and for any requirement that can be stated for the system.
We detail this technique in the next section.
1We will use the equivalent term “SUT” for the remaining of the document)
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2.2 Mutation Testing
This section presents traditional mutation testing, its origins but also the concepts it is based
on.
2.2.1 Traditional Mutation Testing
Mutation testing, like most testing technique, provides a coverage criterion. The mutation cri-
terion is very powerful as it subsumes several other criteria [21].
Originally, mutation testing was proposed by DeMillo et al. Let us summarize the reasoning
presented in [9, 10], the first proposition of mutation testing from DeMillo et al.
First, the authors define the coupling effect hypothesis. It is the hypothesis that, should a
test suite be capable to distinguish simple syntactical changes in a program, it would be able to
distinguish complex changes. The rationale behind this is that complex changes are composed
of simple ones. DeMillo et al. define faults as syntax differences between the working program
and the program the programmer intended to realize. Also, they state that if a test suite is ca-
pable of distinguishing simple differences in the program, it should be capable to distinguishing
all the complex differences subsumed by these slight differences. The recommendation aris-
ing from the coupling effect is to evaluate test suites using their capability of detecting slight
changes (faults) in a program, as the complex changes (complex faults) should also be unveiled
by such test suites.
The second defined principle is the competent programmer hypothesis. It states that pro-
grams created by programmers are very close to the program the programmers intend to create.
The authors do not validate this hypothesis, rather accept it as an empirical principle. The
competent programmer hypothesis states that, by modifying a program using simple changes
rules, one can simulate bug/fault introduction. This final principle was formalized by Geist et
al. [22] : “If the software contains a fault, it is likely that there is a mutant that can only be
killed by a test case that also reveals the fault”.
Finally, relying on these hypotheses, a coverage criterion is defined. To be satisfied, the mu-
tation testing criterion requires the test suite to be capable of distinguishing a set of artificially
introduced faults in the original program (i.e mutants). The mutation testing process, based
on the mutation testing criterion is described in the figure 2.2. We comment the figure bellow.
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Given an original program P and a test suite T,
1. Introduce faults in the original program P, creating mutants of the program under test
(P’ ). The program under test is declined in several mutants containing one or several
faults. These faults are introduced following fault-introducing rules called mutation op-
erators.
2. Run T on P. If the test suite is already capable of identifying real faults in the program,
the program should be corrected. Then, return to (1). If not, assess the quality of the
test suite by verifying that the test suite is capable of finding the introduced faults2. A
mutant distinguised from the original program is referred to as killed whereas the opposite
behavior is referred to as lived. If a mutant LM is lived, the test suite T is incapable of
distinguishing it from P, meaning that T is unable to identify an introduced fault. The
cause can either be that
• T is incomplete, it should be completed with more test cases until it is capable of
killing the mutant LM.
• LM is actually synthetically different from the original program, but semantically
equivalent. Therefore, the tester should ignore this mutant. In traditional mutation
testing, this verification is performed manually, introducing a time consuming task.
In the process described in figure 2.2, those equivalent mutants are ignored after
being uncovered.
3. Correct/Improve the test suite and replay. If this test suite is not capable of discovering
all the introduced faults, the tester should either create new test cases or modify existing
ones. Then, he should replay the process and return to the first step (1).
The mutation testing criterion can be summarized by trying to maximize the mutation
score, defined as
MS =
mutants killed
mutants generated - equivalent mutants
.
Mutation testing has its drawbacks, too. First, it is expensive for practical use [2]. This
cost is mainly due to the number of mutants to be generated and compiled, the number of equiv-
alent ones to be assessed manually, the test execution time and to the lack of efficient mutation
tools. Also, it strongly relies on the mutation operators and on the tool used by the tester [23].
2A tool is very useful in this process by highlighting to the tester the introduced faults that were not uncovered
by his test suite.
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Figure 2.2: The traditional mutation testing process [2].
On the other hand, although the mutation testing process is time consuming, the method
forms one of the most effiscient coverage criterion available for testing [24] [25] [26]. Also, the
technique is known to be flexible, as one can use specific mutation operators, corresponding to
the kind of faults he wants to assess his program is free from. Keeping this fact in mind, we
investigate whether mutation can be used for security testing, using security-aware mutation
operators. We explain the design process of these operators in chapter 4. We clarify in the next
section our choice of PITest as an ideal mutation tool in order to implement and experiment
our mutation operators.
2.2.2 Mutation testing tool : the choice of PITest
In order to evaluate our mutation operators, we needed to implement them in a mutation test-
ing tool. Many of these tools were provided throughout the research domain’s exploration.
For instance, considering only JAVA programs mutation, more than 8 mutation testing tools
developed both by academics and open-source enthusiasts could be cited [27].
In particular, we considered to use MuJava, Major and PIT, as these tools are the most
widely used in the state of the art [23].
• MuJava [28] was developed in a collaboration between Korea Advanced Institute of Science
and Technology (KAIST) and George Mason University, USA [28]. It is one of the oldest
JAVA mutation testing tools, as it was introduced to the academics in 2006. The tool
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works by mutating the source code, but avoids the compilation of all the mutants using
the mutant schemata approach. Hence, it constructs the representation of the mutants by
adding conditional statements to the program under test, triggering (or not) a mutation.
Hence, every of these conditional statements depend on a different Boolean that is added
to the inputs of the program under test. The only way to describe new mutants in MuJava
is to manipulate its sources.
• Major (Mutation Analysis in a JAVA cOmpileR) [29] is more recent than MuJava (2011).
It is a mutation testing framework, integrated into the JAVA compiler (enabled with a
compiler option). The generation of mutants manipulates the Abstract Syntax Tree of
the program under test. Major relies on the compiler for the original program parsing,
avoiding a main challenge of mutation testing tools: the version compliance. The test
running phase is handled by a mutation analyzer, build on top of Apache Ant. Major
provides a DSL to describe new mutation operators.
• PIT [3] is a mutation testing tool mainly developed by open-source mutation testing
enthusiasts. However, it has also been used a lot in research. The tool performs several
optimizations, like test prioritization (also present in Major), but its main characteristic
is that it performs mutation on the program’s byte code in order to avoid the compilation
of the mutants. To keep track of the mutations at source code level, it utilizes a run-time
mapping between byte and source code and prints its results in a html (or csv) report
(see figure 2.3). PIT is easily extendible, describing a new mutation operator is achievable
by implementing a standard visitor pattern class. This last statement forms one of the
reasons for which we chose PIT.
We mainly took the tool’s popularity as a criterion of choice and chose PIT. Indeed, it has
a strong community, exchanging on a Google group3 (more than 400 subjects) and a GitHub
issues tracker4 (more than 93 issues) since 2011. It also provides support for several very im-
portant development tools, e.g an eclipse plugin, a maven plugin and an Ant custom task that
are all maintained by enthusiasts of the domain. Therefore, we strongly believe that PIT will
thrive in the future and engage the impact we seek for the development of the idea we introduce.
Also, we could note the relative easiness of describing new mutation operators in PIT, as
it relies on an intermediate level manipulation API, the ASM5 JAVA byte code manipulation
3The Google group of PIT’s users is available at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/pitusers
4The GitHub issue tracker of PIT is available at https://github.com/hcoles/pitest/issues
5ASM does not stand for anything. It is a reference to the keyword in C which allows some functions to be
implemented in assembly language
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Figure 2.3: Example of html report of PIT. Adapted from [3].
framework6. More details about the way to implement new mutation operators in PIT are
available in chapter 4.
Moreover, none of the tools we presented is known to subsume the others, meaning that
building a test suite with one will kill all the mutants generated by the other. Furthermore,
their effectiveness (their average capability at killing each others mutants) is comparable [23].
Therefore, no choice could rely on the “best tool to use”. Finally, although PIT’s effective-
ness was below the two others, the tendency could change soon, as researchers developed new
operators to improve PIT’s results [30].
2.3 Software security
Security is becoming a key aspect in software engineering mainly because of the costs uncovered
by a successful attack. Hence, attackers may outbreak down-times to the system, modify its
data, or simply get access to critical information. Whereas critical operations such as banking,
government data or healthcare are now managed by Information Systems, a single attack lead-
ing to one of the discussed leaks may be dramatic in terms of reputation and currency costs for
a company but may also result in dramatic events for people [31].
6The ASM JAVA byte code manipulation framework is detailed at http://asm.ow2.org/, the website provides
several tutorials and a user guide. In this study, we used the fourth version of the library.
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Of course, a system may be protected by the use of firewalls, intrusion detection systems or
anti-virus, providing a cost efficient response but the experience has shown that building secure
systems is still needed because those barriers may be bypassed.
Software security is a software’s ability to resist to attacks, its ability to guarantee a func-
tional behavior when attacked [32].
Tian-yanget al. [33] define software security testing as the process of verifying the software’s
security features’ consistency with its design. The idea is to verify that the security features
are implemented and are providing an efficient protection. Hence, the authors divide security
testing into two goals.
The first is called Security functional testing. It relies on the verification and validation of
the implementation of the security requirements, meaning fault-testing applied to the system’s
security requirements. The second is Security vulnerability testing, the verification that there
are no vulnerability left in the system. A vulnerability is referred to as a flaw, relying in the
system’s design or implementation, that may be exploited by attackers. The first goal can be
seen as a developer’s vision of security testing, the second is an attacker’s.
The first goal is also referred to as positive security testing [32], the verification that security
properties are satisfied for a number of assets in the system. The second is also referred to as
negative or destructive security testing. Positive security testing will verify the security features
of a system using legal/intended inputs. Negative security testing will on the other hand test
the system with non-intended inputs. Therefore, the first technique can rely on traditional fault
testing whereas the second will require a more specific expertise from the tester. A last way to
describe the two goals is to perceive the first as the verification that the system does what it
is supposed to do, and the second is the verification that the system never does what it should
not do, referring in both cases to its security.
The complementarity of the two approaches is demonstrated in the following figure 2.4.
Hence, the first approach will stretch green area to fit to the circle and the second will prevent
the green area to exceed from this circle.
An overview of means of including security in the software development life-cycle is devel-
oped in the next section.
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Figure 2.4: Representation of a System’s security. The circle represents its specification. The
system as implemented is represented by the green and the orange parts. “Most faults in
security mechanisms are related to missing or incorrect functionality, most vulnerabilities are
related to unintended side-effect behavior”. Adapted from [4].
2.3.1 Security in the software development life-cycle
Security concerns the whole system under construction. Usually, several barriers are imple-
mented in order to protect a system. These several protections should be designed in advance
in order to be additive/synergistic so that each protection secures a part of the system while
minimizing the breaches in between each protection.
Therefore, security, as any other non-functional requirement, must be included in the soft-
ware development life-cycle. The overview of the practices that should be applied in order to
secure a software is developed following McGraw [5] on figure 2.5. These practices are security
activities taking place in the development life-cycle. Further explanations about the proposed
techniques are detailed in section 2.3.2.
We can see that every phase of the software development cycle has several security building
activities. Usually, one considers securing its system to a certain point, using risk analysis [4].
Security requirements cover both positive and negative security views. Abuse cases may repre-
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Figure 2.5: The software development life-cycle, aggregated with security practices applicable
at each of its steps [5].
sent the requirements for negative security. Abuse cases describe how the system reacts when
it is under attack. At every level of design, practitioners should use risk analysis. Risk analysis
is the process of ranking possible attacks on the system by their probability of appearance
but also by their cost. The design must be thought in order to mitigate and/or suppress risks
on the system. Then, it should be analyzed again to document possible attacks. External
review, performed by external experts, may also be used. At code level, static analysis and dy-
namic security testing should be performed. Static analysis focuses on the discovery of known
vulnerabilities. Security testing must, as explained before, cover both positive and negative
requirements. Then, prior to delivery, penetration testing may also be performed. Because pen-
etration testing may potentially be infinite, it should be driven via risk assessment. Penetration
testing is very valuable as it tests the system within its environment. If a vulnerability cannot
be secured, monitoring the systems’ behavior against attacks relying on this vulnerability is also
recommended. This step of mitigating impacts of those unprotectable attacks is called security
operations. Because it uses the information’s gained throughout the previous activities, this
phase is performed at the end.
In the next section, several security testing techniques ensuring this non-functional require-
ment at every phase of the development life-cycle are developed.
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2.3.2 Security testing in the software development life-cycle
Many security testing techniques exist. As our goal is not to provide an exhaustive enumer-
ation of these techniques, we rather give a summary of the techniques that are applicable at
every phase of the development life-cycle that we could discover in [4], and that were originally
proposed in OWASP’s7 testing guide [34].
The figure 2.6 gives the families of techniques proposed by the survey and their moment of
appliance in the development life-cycle.
Figure 2.6: The software development life-cycle, aggregated with security testing techniques
applicable at every step [4].
Model Based security testing
OWASP proposes Model Based security testing as security testing activity after the analysis
phase and before the design phase. Model Based security testing consists in the following steps.
• This technique first constructs a model of the behavior of the software (and/or its envi-
ronment) in order to later derive test cases from this model. The behavior of the system
may be described in many manners including activity diagrams, sequence diagrams or
simply input/output matrices [33].
• Then, security requirements (based on the security properties of the system’s specification)
are defined using a model-dedicated syntax.
• The next step is to generate automatically test cases derived from the model. That means
execution traces of the model.
7OWASP: Open Web Application Security Project is an online community that aims at providing free resources
in the field of web application security.
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• Finally, the last step maps test cases from the model to real tests, that is tests launchable
on the SUT.
Both positive and negative security testing may be performed at model level as one may
model the behavior of the system but also the possible behavior of an attacker in order to derive
test cases.
For instance, Model Based Security Testing has been experimented by Bu¨chler et al. [35]
for web app security testing. They take as assumption that a model of the web application and
security properties are available. Then, they mutate this model using mutation operators in-
troducing security-flaws. Next, they generate test cases by launching the model checker on the
mutants. Model checking is a technique that consists in checking the satisfaction of a property
in all the possible states of a model. Thus, the model checkers finds all sequences of operations
that can uncover security problems in the mutants. Finally, those sequences of operations are
semi-automatically mapped on real sequences, creating a selenium test for each sequence. We
go through the details of their technique in chapter 3.
The advantage of model based security analysis is that it can be performed early in the
development cycle therefore enabling early vulnerabilities discovery.
Code-based testing and static analysis
During the development phase in the life-cycle, OWASP [4] states the possible usage of code-
based security testing and static analysis. Code-based security testing is mainly code analysis,
i.e manually using code review or automatically using static analysis or another technique. In
this section, we will concentrate on the static analysis.
Felderer et al. define static analysis as an attempt to automate code reviews. Hence, static
security analysis automatically browses through the code seeking for fault patterns. As a vul-
nerability is a specific kind of fault, and static analyzer may thus be specialized for finding
vulnerability patterns. Of course, there is an infinity of vulnerability patterns to be encoded in
the static analyzer so one cannot expect this tool to be 100% accurate. However, experience
has shown that this technique may effectively find many vulnerabilities [36]. Static analysis
can be applied at source code or byte code level, the idea is that static analysis never runs
the code. Though, the method also allows semantic checks, meaning an analysis of how the
program should run, by the lecture of its code.
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The advantages of static analysis for security testing is that it is relatively cheap and it can
be performed quite early in the development cycle, as soon as a piece of code is available. Its
drawbacks are that it requires human intervention, as a consequence of its static nature. Hence,
because it does not run the code, uncovered vulnerabilities may not always lead to a failure.
This problem is known as the false positive problem. Moreover, as we stated before, the fact
that it does not find a vulnerability does not mean that the vulnerability is not there. This is
known as the false negative problem.
We present a vulnerability static analyzer that was very helpful in our research in section
2.3.3.
Dynamic Analysis and Penetration testing
In the previous section, we presented statical ways of evaluating a system’s security. In this
section, we will focus on dynamic security testing, running the code in order to assess its security.
OWASP proposes to perform dynamic security testing after the deployment phase. This
specification is likely due to the fact that its goal is to test security in its real environment.
Moreover, we also hypothesize that security protections are implemented in order to be ad-
ditive (minimizing the breaches in between each protection), so that there is no sense to test
dynamically the security of a system before it is deployed.
Penetration Testing is a dynamic testing technique specialized in security testing. NIST [6]
defines penetration testing as security testing the system in its environment, with the help of a
penetration tester. A penetration tester is a practitioner performing real-world attacks on the
system. Because the system is tested in its environment of deployment, one must always obtain
the approval of the organization for which the system was built before performing penetration
testing. Hence, the organization must differentiate the pen tester’s activity from a real attack.
NIST divides penetration testing in four phases.
1. Planning: The first phase is to plan how the testing will be performed and acquire the
organizations’ approval. All the tests are defined and documented, explaining which part
of the system is targeted and what is the expected behavior, for instance.
2. Discovery: The phase is divided in two parts. First, the pen tester discovers the attack
surface of the system under test. That is gathering information about the system like its
open ports, the services it runs, the versions of API’s it utilizes, the OS it runs on, etc.
The goal is to enumerate all the potential targets. Then, the pen tester compares this set
to attacks’ needs, in order to forecast what attack he will perform in the next phase.
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3. Attack: During this phase, the pen tester simply performs the attacks he planned on
the last phase. An attack consists in sending a set of malicious payloads to the target.
If an attack succeeds, the found vulnerability is exploited in order to pursue the attack
and access to more information or privileges on the target. The idea behind this is to
understand the risks of the found vulnerability. The “expanded attack surface” is fed
back to discovery phase in order to continue the process.
4. Reporting: This phase is performed in parallel with the three other phases. This phase
consists in reporting the identified vulnerabilities, rank those in terms of severity, and
give an advice on how to mitigate the vulnerabilities that are exploitable.
The next figure illustrates the process of penetration testing 2.7.
Figure 2.7: The process of penetration testing [6].
Vulnerability scanning can be seen as automatic pen testing. Hence, it consists in using
tools called Vulnerability scanners, automatically sending malicious payloads to the SUT. Usu-
ally, vulnerability scanners are used by pen testers, benefiting of their experience in order to
use the tools effectively.
Fuzzing consists in automatically sending “random” inputs to the SUT in order to make it
crash or to launch an unintended behavior. The idea behind fuzzing is to test the behavior of
the SUT under non intended inputs. We quote random because, as the technique was originally
sending random inputs, modern techniques may also rely on the analysis of the SUT’s code
or on the smart choice of the inputs. Fuzzers may be compared in terms of effectiveness by
comparing the number of un-intended behaviors they trigger on the SUT, in a given amount of
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time. In order to perform this comparison, one needs sets of documented vulnerable systems.
We will come back to this last technique in the next chapters.
Security Regression Testing
The technique consists in applying traditional regression testing on the security requirements
of the system. Hence, regression testing intends to create a high-coverage test suite, aiming at
giving confidence that the SUT is legit to its specification. The test suite is then used during
the maintenance phase by launching this suite after the introduction of a modification, in order
to gain confidence that the modification did not alter the system’s conformance to the original
specification.
In security testing techniques performed during the software development life-cycle, OWASP
advises to create security regression test suites to support maintenance. By this mean, it
helps the software developers not to introduce vulnerabilities while modifying the system. The
security regression test suite can take many forms, from the set of unit tests to the report of
the pen testing phase. The idea is to have, again, a coverage measure and to automate as much
as possible the testing activity.
2.3.3 Used security testing tool: Findbugs-sec
In this section, we expose a real-world static analyzer aiming at finding vulnerabilities in JAVA
code, that we utilized in our experimentation. This gives us the opportunity to illustrate the
sub-section 2.3.2, that presented static analysis and code based security testing techniques.
FindBugs [37] is an open source static analyzer for JAVA, running at byte-code level. It is
very popular as it has been downloaded more than a million times. The tool has been developed
and is currently still maintained by the University of Maryland, USA. The tool reports almost
300 different fault patterns [38] and offers the possibility to create custom plug-ins. Many fault
patterns are discovered using state machines on the class-files or by using the visitor pattern on
method byte-codes. The static analyzer is, among others, used by Google. The organization
runs it over any code being modified [38].
FindBugs is available in various forms, e.g in a maven plugin, in an eclipse plugin (figure
2.8), an IntelliJ plugin, an Android Studio plugin, a NetBeans plugin, in an Ant task, by
using the command line or by using its GUI (figure 2.9). The tool is also highly configurable,
enabling us to use filters or configure its sensitiveness to specific bug patterns. All its utilization
possibilities are documented in a user manual.
19
Figure 2.8: Findbugs eclipse plugin illustration of usage.
During our research, we used FindBugs but more specifically one of its most popular plugin,
Findbugs-sec [19]. The plugin enables Findbugs to highlight more than 110 different vulnera-
bilities. Therefore, Findbugs can, by activating this plugin, become a security static analyzer
(see sub-section 2.3.2).
The plugin is open source, and was originally developped by Philippe Arteau [19]. All the
patterns the plugin highlights are described in its documentation. A great advantage of the tool
is that every vulnerability it uncovers is justified by a CVE or NIST recommendation. This last
statement enables us to use the tool’s documented vulnerabilities in order to create real-world
mutation operators. We detail this process in chapter 4.
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Figure 2.9: Findbugs’ GUI illustration of usage.
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Chapter 3
Mutation Security Testing
This chapter develops the state of the art of the research problem we briefly described in the
introduction. Therefore, we begin by enunciating in details the research problem we try to
handle. Then, we supply the related work partially handling the problem or related to it.
3.1 Problem statement
In chapter 2, we motivated the usefulness of mutation testing in the tests’ creation process
and stated several security testing techniques. Yet, the relation between security testing and
mutation analysis remains to be explored. Indeed, existing mutation operators, especially those
used by the JAVA mutation testing tools [23], are restricted to simple syntactic alterations and
faults. Because these syntactic modifications are unlikely to (effectively) introduce security
defects, we believe that mutation security testing requires the creation of specialized operators.
Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses that guided our research.
Non security-aware mutation operators are unlikely to incidentally generate vulnerable
mutants.
Although designing mutation operators that introduce vulnerabilities has been explored
before (see next section 3.2), it seems that there is no set of security-aware mutation operators
at code level.
Mutation operators specialized in introducing vulnerabilities at code level were never
experimented before.
In this thesis, we solve the issue by designing these security-aware mutation operators, intro-
ducing vulnerabilities rather than simple faults. For demonstration, we design these operators
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for the JAVA language as this language is very popular to implement security-aware systems.
In the next section, we present the related work, the different ways of designing security
mutation operators that we could find and demonstrate, for each of them, their non applicability
in our context.
3.2 Related work
3.2.1 Mouehli et al.: Mutating access control models
In this work, the authors [39] aim at giving a criterion to test the access control policy of 3-tier
applications written in the ORBAC language (ORganisation Based Access Control). ORBAC is
a language specifically designed to write access control policies. It allows programmers to define
Permissions, Prohibitions, or Obligations. All these rules are defined as 5-uples of entities: the
organization, the role, the activity, the view and the context. Usually, rules specifying access
control policies are defined using 3-uples of Subjects, Actions and Objects. The 5-uples rules used
in ORBAC are actually these exact 3-uples to which the language concatenates an organization
and a context in which the rule is valid (see figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Illustrating how the concepts of Subjects, Actions and Objects are respectively
related to Roles, Activities and Views in order to define security rules in ORBAC [7].
The authors provide examples of those rules for a library management system. In this
system, an access control requirement can be Users are allowed to borrow a book only when the li-
brary is opened. The rule is defined as : Permission(Library, Borrower, BorrowerActivity,
Book, WorkingDays). The rule contains a specific library as organization entity, the role of a
borrower, the activities that a borrower may perform in the system, the view of a book and the
context of the working days.
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Rules specifying access control policies may sometimes be conflicting, and ORBAC has the
advantage to propose a processing tool (MotOrBAC [40]) aiming at discovering those conflicts.
The authors state that there is no automatic way to generate secure code enhancing a
security policy. Therefore, programmers should implement themselves the Permissions, Pro-
hibitions and Obligations in the code of the application. They also state that because the
implementation of the access control rules is manual, it must imperatively be tested. In order
to perform this, the authors propose mutation operators, mutating the rules that compose the
access control policy. Using the generated mutants, the testers discover which abstract cases
they should cover. Mouelhi et al. state that the advantage of the method is that the faults
introduced specifically aim at testing the security of the SUT. However, the drawback of the
method is that imagining the mapping between the mutations and errors in the implementation,
a relatively hard task, is left to the tester. They mitigate this problem by proposing a mapping
tool between the ORBAC access control rules and the code implementing each rule.
The mutation operators are diverse: they can change the organization, role, activity, view
or context in a rule. They may also invert Permissions, Obligations or Prohibitions. Mouelhi
et al. also implemented a mutation-testing tool, as an additional part of MotORBAC.
The method is interesting but its objective is really different from what we would
like to achieve. Hence, we would like to generate vulnerabilities lying at code level
in order to be able to focus on concrete vulnerabilities when implementing a security
test-suite. The current method is limited to generating those vulnerabilities at model
level and lets the tester imagine what those abstract flaws would look like at code
level. Also, model-based mutation introduces different faults than those introduced a
the code-level [41].
3.2.2 Dadeau et al.: Mutating high-level security protocols
In this research, the authors investigate the possibility of verifying security properties (like
secrecy, authentication or data integrity) in the implementation of security protocols. Those
protocols are defined in the high-level security protocol language HLPSL and are specifically
aiming at establishing a trust-full communication link between actors1.
1Actors are participants in a protocol. In HLPSL, an actor is represented by a state-transition system where
transitions are triggered by received messages and where actions trigger messages being sent.
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The approach proposes to mutate the model of the protocol-under-test, in order to gener-
ate abstract test cases, by validating automatically the generated mutants. The abstract test
cases obtained should then be followed as a criterion for implementing test cases on the imple-
mentation of the protocol. Thus, the authors introduce new mutation operators that aim at
introducing leaks in the models of the protocol and at representing real world implementation
faults.
The mutation operators introduce the following faults: replacing in a protocol specification
every encryption by a xor-encryption, decomposing information blocks in encrypted messages,
injecting the use of the same public key by two different actors, suppressing the verification
of message provenance in the behavior of an actor, omitting hash functions and permuting
the order of information blocks in a message. All the operators are justified by providing an
example of protocol where their usage leads to a security failure.
Aside from the fact that the method is applied at model level and that we are focusing
on code level, it also is not applicable in the context of our research. Hence, the authors
propose security-aware mutation operators for protocols whereas aim at introducing
security faults in webapps.
3.2.3 Bu¨chler et al.: Mutating abstract model of web applications
In this work, the authors propose a semi-automatic testing technique for web applications [8].
Their methodology assumes that the penetration tester possesses a model of the webapp under
test and that the security properties (e.g confidentiality, authenticity, etc.) of the model under
test are available. Thus, the model satisfies its security properties.
The methodology is composed of four essential steps (see figure 3.2).
1. First, mutate the model using specific mutation operators specifically designed to in-
troduce vulnerabilities in the model. The mutation operators are associated to several
security properties that they threatened before, i.e in another insecure model, enabling the
methodology to use a mutation operator only if it is likely to introduce a vulnerability in
the SUT’s model. The authors list themselves the security properties that each mutation
operator threatens and gather those from the analysis of several vulnerable applications.
This step generates several vulnerable mutants, i.e insecure models that represent faulty
implementations of the SUT, where a fault led to the injected vulnerability.
2. Second, run a model checker on the vulnerable mutants. Each mutant is run with the
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security properties of its original model. The model checker outputs a trace for every
mutant where a security property is violated (item 1 on the figure). Every trace is taken
as an abstract test case that should be mapped on a concrete test case. This step thus
generates a set of abstract test cases.
3. Next, translate each abstract test case in a concrete test case by using a 2-step mapping
(item 2 and 3 on the figure).
4. Finally, run the concrete test cases on the real system by using an automatic test execution
engine. This engine may ask help from a penetration tester when it cannot perform an
action. These actions are the abstract steps of an abstract test case that could not be
mapped to concrete actions.
Figure 3.2: Bu¨chler et al. methodology. “Overview of the testing process” [8]
The model of the application is built using the abstract messages that it supports from
the user like the log in to the application, view the other users’ profile, etc. Therefore, an
attack trace generated by the model checker will consist in a sequence of abstract messages
sent by the user to the server. Both the model and the properties are defined in AVANTSSAR
Specification Language (ASLan++), an input language for model checkers that is dedicated to
security analysis. The 2-step mapping first consists in the translation of the message-sequence
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attacks into an intermediate language (called WAAL: Web Application Abstract Language2)
that is independent from the webapp under test. Then, the WAAL attack trace is mapped to
a concrete sequence of actions that are described using the Selenium framework3. The help of
the penetration tester will be needed for actions that are not supported by the framework, that
fact leading to the semi-automatic nature of the methodology.
The authors explain that their mutation operators are related to real vulnerabilities that
they found in unsecured webapps. Hence they were built by the following steps:
1. First, analyze a set of vulnerable web applications and gather their vulnerabilities.
2. Next, build or obtain a secured model of these web applications, i.e the model of the web
application as it should have been implemented. Build and obtain the security properties
of the models.
3. Then, link each real world vulnerability to the security properties that it violates.
4. Finally, build a mutation operator working at model level that introduces, at model
level, an equivalent to each real world vulnerability considered. Then, verify that every
mutation operator is actually capable of generating a vulnerable mutant. That step is
realized by generating a mutant in order to run it on the model checker and verify that the
security properties it should violate are indeed violated. The whole process furnishes to
the authors a set of t-uples (mutation operator, security property violated by the operator).
The authors evaluate their operators on a case study. Hence, they state that the appli-
ance of their operators helped them at finding vulnerabilities in an unsecured web application,
WebGoat4.
2WAAL is an abstract language that enables the specification of actions that a user must perform using the
browser and the specification of verifications to be performed on the server’s response. WAAL is used here to
describe a set of actions to perform by using the browser. Its interest as a layer between the trace given by the
model checker and the concrete test is to define the exact actions and verifications to perform in order to conduct
the test. This enables the penetration tester to perform the test himself by using the WAAL specification of the
test.
3Selenium is an open source portable testing framework for web applications. It provides support in several
programming languages including C#, JAVA, PHP, Python and Scala. The tests consist in actions performed
at browser level and in the analysis of the browser’s responses.
4WebGoat is an intentionally vulnerable web application developed by OWASP.
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP WebGoat Project
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Again, the method relies on operators working at model level. However, the authors
explain that they possess a mapping between real world vulnerabilities and vulner-
abilities at model level. This mapping could be interesting to analyze, in order to
inject those real world vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, Bu¨chler et al. do not detail
their operators.
3.2.4 Mutating C programs by introducing memory manipulation issues
Memory faults may lead to a large diversity of vulnerabilities. Nanavati et al. state that mem-
ory faults have led before to vulnerabilities such as uninitialized memory access, buffer overruns,
invalid pointer access, beyond stack access, free memory access or memory leaks in C appli-
cations. Moreover the authors add that these memory faults have been ranked in the top 25
most dangerous programming errors by CWE SANS. Therefore, the authors introduce Memory
Mutation Operators (MeMOs) capable of injecting common memory faults in C programs in
order to enable mutation testing for security. Thus, Nanavati et al. focus on one specific class
of vulnerabilities when testing the security of an application. Moreover, the authors prove the
applicability of their mutation operators by killing the mutants they generate on 16 subject
C programs. Their operators are composed of three categories: uninitialized memory access,
faulty memory allocation and faulty heap management.
This approach towards security-aware mutation operators in C has also been experienced
by Shahriar and Zulkernine [42]. Hence, Shariar and Zulhernine propose 12 mutation oper-
ators that mutate ANSI C standard library functions, modify buffer size arguments in ANSI
C standard library functions, mutate format strings, increase buffer variable sizes and remove
null character assignment statements. These operators are designed for their capacity in in-
troducing vulnerabilities that are potentially exploitable to perform a Buffer Overflow5 attack.
The authors demonstrate the applicability of their mutation operators on four case studies, by
killing most of the mutants they generate using their operators.
Ghosh et al. [43] also mutate C programs in order to identify software chunks that may
threaten security properties when mutated (altered). The idea is to leverage those code snip-
pets to the programmer in order to raise its awareness about those locations where a security
property violation is possible. Moreover, their goal is to show the programmer or analyst how
badly the software could behave at specific locations, if it was altered. The authors justify their
approach by stating that rather than searching for flaws in software, they simulate the effects
5A Buffer Overflow is an overflow in data buffers that might lead to the corruption of neighboring variables [42].
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of flaws in software and leverage locations where fault-tolerant mechanisms might be needed.
Their methodology has been implemented in a tool named the Fault Injection Security Tool
(FIST). It performs white-box dynamic security analysis of the SUT using program inputs, fault
injection and security assertion verification for programs written in C and C++. Hence, it con-
sists in running the mutants with legal, random, and illegal inputs and controlling their state for
violations of security assertions that are a priori provided by the analyst. If a security assertion
is violated, the fault and the input that triggered the violation are recorded for further analysis.
In their study, Ghosh et al. propose several types of mutation operators. They name their
types of operators buffer overflow, data corruption, string manipulation and fault composition.
The buffer overflow operator overwrite the return address of the stack frame in which the buffer
is allocated with the address of the buffer itself. Also, the buffer is filled with machine in-
structions by the operator. These machine instructions will thus be run whenever the program
reaches the return point that was modified, resulting in the corruption of the program state and
the possible violation of a security assertion. The data corruption operators consist in simple
syntactic changes in booleans, characters, strings, integers and doubles. For instance, these
operators apply a negation to a boolean value or substitute a character with a random other,
randomly chosen in the ASCII table. The string manipulation operators also consist in some
rather simple syntactic changes. For instance, these operators truncate strings or substitute a
string with a randomly generated other. The last type of operator consists in the possibility to
compose faults, by composing the previously introduced mutation operators.
The data corruption operators are very close to standard mutation operators, and we thus
will not need to re-implement those in our study. Moreover, in all the operators they introduce,
only the buffer overflow operator seems to specifically aim at introducing vulnerabilities.
In every explored method, the authors have found an effective set of mutation op-
erators that is actually capable of injecting vulnerabilities at code level. However,
the vulnerabilities they inject are not applicable in our context. Hence, all of their
mutation operators consist in the introduction of memory manipulation faults in C
programs. As all these memory manipulations make use of memory functions that
are specific to C, these operators are not applicable in our context of JAVA Web
Applications.
In the next section, we summarize the state-of-the-art that we just explored in the sections
3.2.1 to 3.2.4.
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3.2.5 Conclusion
Using mutation for security purposes was explored at the model-level by Mouehli et al. [39]
where the authors mutate access control models to qualify security test suites. Operators
change user roles and allow actions, deleting policy rules or modify their application context.
Dadeau et al. defined operators that introduce leaks in a high-level security protocol [44].
Bu¨chler et al. considered mutating the abstract model of a web application by removing au-
thorization checks and un-sanitizing data [8], but they do not detail the operators. Though
such operators also take inspiration from actual vulnerabilities, model-based and code-based
mutation exercise different faults [41], these works are thus not directly applicable to ours.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no set of security-aware mutation operators at code
level that suits our context. Perhaps the closest related work is that of Nanavati et al. [45],
Shahriar and Zulkernine [42] and Ghosh et al. [43] that defined mutation operators related to
the memory related faults. As explained in section 3.2.4, all these operators introduce memory
manipulation issues in C programs (such buffer overflows, uninitialized memory allocations,
etc.), which may be exploited by security attacks. As these operators make heavy use of
memory allocation primitives, specific to the C language, they are not applicable to our context
(JAVA webapps) and are not targeted at generating a wide range of security issues.
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Chapter 4
Security aware mutation operators
In this chapter, we address our research problem by stating possible security-oriented mutation
operators. First, we present the procedure we followed to shape the operators in section 4.1.
Then, we articulate the abstract definition of these operators in section 4.2. Finally, we also
give technical details about their implementation in section 4.3.
4.1 Mutation operators definition procedure
This section presents the process we followed to design our mutation operators.
Security related issues have received little attention by the mutation testing literature. As
a result, it lacks operators that introduce security bugs. While security bugs are more or less
well studied, there is no clear definition that we could use. Therefore, for the purposes of this
study we will use the following definition: a security bug is a piece of code that can lead to one
or several vulnerabilities in an application.
Research on software security developed a number of techniques to identify vulnerabilities
in source code. We have seen such a (effective) technique, static analysis in chapter 3. As we
explained, static analyzers aim at identifying occurrences of problematic code patterns. Such
tools applied to security detect security bugs by highlighting potentially vulnerable code pat-
terns based on common vulnerability patterns. In view of this, we propose to leverage their
knowledge and gather a set of common security bugs, which we can turn into injectable faults.
These faults can form our mutants and support security testing.
By gathering the security patterns supported by known static analysis tools, we can identify
certain types of security related faults. Unfortunately, these patterns only detect the presence
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of a potentially vulnerable code and not the needed transformation to inject a vulnerability.
Indeed, a security mutation operator identifies a non-vulnerable code pattern and turns it into
a vulnerable one.
Therefore, in order to define our operators, we transformed every occurrence of a vulnerable
pattern we could gather in its non-vulnerable functional equivalent version. This was not a
trivial task as it required manual analysis and comprehension of the vulnerability classes.
Figure 4.1: Process followed to design security-aware mutation operators.
provides
Vulnerable code pattern
Non vulnerable pattern
Manually revert Mutation operator
For the purposes of the present study, we used the security patterns of a well-known static
security bug analyzer, named FindBugs-sec plugin. All the patterns we used are described
in the plugin’s documentation [19]. We believe that these patterns are suitable for our pur-
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poses as most of them form real-world security bugs, this being shown with CVE1 and NIST2
references. We detail our operators in the next section. We illustrate our process with figure 4.1.
The next step was to implement those operators in a JAVA mutation tool. After investigat-
ing which tool to use (see chapter 2), we implemented our operators in a popular open source
mutation tool called PITest [3]. We explain briefly the implementation of our operators in PIT
and, more generally, how mutation operators are implemented and used in the tool in section 4.3.
While implementing our operators, we manually reviewed them. In order to check the
viability and the correct implementation of our operators, we generated by their use several
vulnerable sample programs. By viability checking, we mean verifying that the vulnerabilities
did not compromise the class in which they were introduced.
4.2 High level definition of the operators
Table 4.1 couples acronyms to a short description for each of the security-aware mutation op-
erators we propose.
In this section, we will give for every operator its application Context, the vulnerability it
is trying to generate in the Goal section, and a short specification of its implementation in the
Specification section. Table 4.1 also sorts the different operators by their nature and by their
implementation design. We present the operators in the next sections.
Replacing secured objects with unsecured:
In this section, we present the mutation operators that replace secured objects with unsecured.
Use predictable pseudo random number generator (UPPNRG).
Context: In secure-aware contexts and more specifically in encryption, developers need Pseudo
Random Number Generators for features like salts and keys generation. In order to avoid
prediction easing an undesired decryption, the PNRGs used in this context should be
unpredictable.
1CVE: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures : is a database of known information-security vulnerabilities
and exposures maintained by the MITRE corporation.
2NIST: The National Institute of Standards and Technology publish technical reports about many subjects
in IT. Moreover, they often publish reports regarding common vulnerabilities and good practices for security
engineers.
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Table 4.1: Security-aware Mutation Operators
Acronym Name
Replacing secured objects with unsecured:
UPPRNG USE PREDICTABLE PSEUDO RAND NUM GEN
UWMD USE WEAK MESSAGE DIGEST
REIS REMOVE ENCRYPTION IN SOCKET
PSQLI PERMIT SQL INJECTION
Removing security features on java objects:
XMLPVXEE XML PARSER VULNERABLE TO XEE
XMLPVXXE XML PARSER VULNERABLE TO XXE
UC UNSECURE COOKIE
RHTTPOFC REMOVE HTTPONLY FROM COOKIE
Weakening encryption algorithms:
URSAWSK USE RSA WITH SHORT KEY
UBFWSK USE BLOWFISH WITH SHORT KEY
Removing standard sanitization functions:
RPTS REMOVE PATH TRAVERSAL SANITIZATION
RRS REMOVE REGEX SANITIZATION
Replacing strong with weak encryption algorithms:
UDESISE USE DES IN SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
UECBISE USE ECB IN SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
Removing authentication mechanisms:
RHNV REMOVE HOST NAME VERIFICATION
Goal: The UPPNRG operator’s goal is to make the application vulnerable to predictable random
number generator exploiting attacks. The success of these attacks can lead to various
security leaks regarding the confidentiality, authorization, etc. of the application.
Specification: The operator trades unpredictable PRNGs’ usages for predictable PRNGs’ us-
ages.
Use weak message digest (UWMD).
Context: Message digests, or hashing functions, are very often used to assure the integrity
of received data. They may also be used in authentication mechanisms. However, some
hash functions are weak because of their high collision degree: in this case, for a hashed
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string, a malicious user can easily craft another string producing the same hash.
Goal: The UWMD operator introduces a vulnerability in integrity checking of received data or in
authentication mechanisms by replacing a secured hash function (i.e, SHA-256) use with
a unsecured hash function (MD5).
Specification: It recognizes hash function utilization and replaces those by MD5 usage.
Remove encryption in socket (REIS).
Context: Web applications very often need to communicate with users using a encrypted
channel. Indeed, confidential data such as passwords or e-mail addresses should never be
exchanged unencrypted. A safe channel is commonly implemented using SSL on HTTP.
Goal: The REIS operator weakens the confidentiality of exchanged data, exposing the appli-
cation to a confidentiality leak.
Specification: It removes the use of SSL in https sockets.
Permit SQL injection (PSQLI).
Context: SQL injections exploit the fact that the web application uses input(s) from the
user to build an SQL query that will be executed by a Data Base Management System
(DBMS). The idea of the SQL injection is to inject SQL code in the inputs that are used
to build the query, in order to maliciously alter the database and/or get access to private
information. To prevent these attacks, JAVA APIs provide methods to prepare/encode
queries and send them without their external inputs to the DBMS, requiring these inputs
separately from the user. The DBMS that received the encoded query waits for the arrival
of the inputs in order to finalize the construction of the query and execute it. Using this
solution, it is not possible anymore for an attacker to play with the SQL-syntax to create
tainted queries as the semantic of the query is computed without taking account of the
inputs values.
Goal: The PSQLI operator tries to weaken the web application’s protection against SQL-
injection attacks to expose it to various security leaks potentially threatening its confi-
dentiality, integrity, and authentication mechanisms.
Specification: It detects usages of SQL injection-proof APIs for query executions and replaces
such usages by unsecured APIs query executions.
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Removing security features on JAVA objects:
In this section, we detail the mutation operators that remove security features on JAVA objects.
Make XML parser vulnerable to XML external entity expansion attack (XMLPVXEE).
Context: Web services often parse XML documents, to communicate with other web services
in a standardized way. A known attack is the billion laughs attack which is an instance
of a denial of service attack on XML parsers that require them to exponentially expand
the tree with dummy text (“LOL”). However, one can prevent this attack by enabling a
standard security option on the XML parser.
Goal: The XMLPVXXE operator introduces a vulnerability in external XML parsers to expose
the application to DOS attacks.
Specification: The operator disables standard security options of the XML parsers just before
the XML parser begins parsing. It performs this task by identifying methods used on
standard XML Java parsers, like XMLReader or SAXParser instances.
Make XML parser vulnerable to XML external entity attack (XMLPVXXE).
Context: For this operator, we add to XMLPVXEE’s context that the attacker has access to
the XML document parsing result. The hypothesis we added enables XXE attacks to be
performed on the XML parser. Indeed, the attack’s goal is to access to confidential (or
unauthorized) files. Thankfully, XML parsers provide standard options restricting usage
of commonly used XML tags in XXE attacks.
Goal: The XMLPVXXE operator aims at introducing a vulnerability to XXE attacks on XML
parsers that are used by the application under test.
Specification: In a similar way as the XMLPVXEE operator, the XMLPVXXE operator disables XXE
security options on XML parser objects. It disables this options just before a parsing
begins, in the code of the application.
Unsecure cookie (UC).
Context: Cookies are defined by the HTTP protocol as pieces of information sent by the
server to the client’s browser. Some cookies can store secret values that prove a client’s
authentication and must therefore be encrypted using SSL during communication. Cook-
ies are meant to be sent by the browser with each request from the client, disregarding the
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secured-nature of the communication. To make sure that a browser will not send a sensi-
tive cookie in an unsecured HTTP communication by mistake, a secure flag can be set on
the cookie, asking the browser to send this cookie only during HTTPS communications.
Goal: The UC operator allows to send sensitive cookies during unsecured HTTP communica-
tion. The mutation can lead to authentication leaks. Confidentiality and authorization
leaks can also potentially be introduced by the operator.
Specification: It removes the call to standard methods setting the secure flag on cookies.
Remove HTTP-only flag from cookie (RHTTPOFC).
Context: Even if a cookie was sent using an HTTPS communication, web pages’ scripts can
access it on the client-side by asking the browser concrete access to the sessions’ cookies.
An attacker may get access to those cookies on the client-side by using a cross-site scripting
(XSS) attack. To prevent this, cookies have an HttpOnly flag asking the client’s browser
to not share this cookie with scripts. Of course, the flag mitigates the risk and does not
remove it, since it relies on the trust in the browser.
Goal: The RHTTPOFC operator exposes the web pages to such cookies confidentiality leaks.
Specification: It removes the call to the methods setting the http-only flag on cookies.
Weakening encryption algorithms:
In this section, we present the mutation operators that are weakening encryption algorithms.
Use RSA with short key (URSAWSK).
Context: RSA is an asymmetric encryption algorithm used in web applications to exchange
confidential data. Over time, with the improvement of computation power, the RSA
algorithm needs longer keys to keep the exchange secured and to resist to brute force
attacks. NIST3 recommends the RSA keys to be at least 2048 bits long.
Goal: The URSAWSK operator tries to weaken RSA encryption so that brute force attacks are
possible, allowing confidential data to leak.
Specification: It detects the use of RSA encryption with a sufficient key size and sets its to
512 bits.
3http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf
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Use Blowfish with short key (UBFWSK).
Context: Blowfish is a variable key size symmetric encryption algorithm five times faster than
triple DES. Just like RSA, Blowfish could also be used with a insufficient key size (less
than 128 bits).
Goal: The UBFWSK operator tries to weaken Blowfish encryption to expose the application to
brute force attacks, thus allowing data to confidentiality leaks.
Specification: When the operator detects the usage of Blowfish with a sufficient key size, it
sets the key size to 64 bits.
Removing standard sanitization functions:
In this section, we present the mutation operator that remove standard ways of sanitizing inputs
coming from an external user.
Remove path traversal sanitization (RPTS).
Context: Web applications may often provide internal file access to external users. This feature
is commonly designed by asking the user the name of the file he wants access to.
Goal: The RPTS operator introduces a vulnerability which allows a malicious user to enter a
path where a file name was required. This attack may give him access to directories or
files regardless of the webapp’s file access policy.
Specification: The operator simply removes (input) file names sanitization functions, generally
used to avoid this vulnerability.
Remove regex sanitization (RRS).
Context: Modern websites are following the idea of WEB 2.0, enabling the participation of
external users to the content of a web page. Thus, web applications can store a lot of
content coming from external users. To prevent storing malicious users’ content, web
applications commonly validate the inputs coming from external sources using regular
expressions.
Goal: The RRS operator tries to introduce vulnerabilities in external input filters of a web
application.
Specification: It detects regular expressions usages and replace them by a dummy expression,
which is always true.
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Replacing strong with weak encryption algorithms:
In this section, we explain the mutation operators that replace strong encryption algorithms
usages with weak encryption algorithms usages.
Use DES in symmetric encryption (UDESISE).
Context: In secured web applications, symmetric encryption is often very valuable to exchange
sensitive data with external users. Data Encryption Standard (DES) was a popular
symmetric encryption algorithm that became nowadays sensitive to brute force attacks
due to the great advances in computer performances. Therefore, web applications should
prefer other symmetric encryption algorithms, like AES.
Goal: The idea of the UDESISE operator is to weaken the confidentiality of symmetrically
encrypted data, exposing it to leaks.
Specification: It detects the usage of a symmetric encryption algorithm and replaces it with
DES encryption. This operator requires to modify several JAVA code lines. Though,
PIT’s architecture wasn’t designed for this kind of modifications. Therefore, UDESISE is
still under review but our initial implementation provides promising results.
Use ECB in symmetric encryption (UECBISE).
Context: Symmetric encryption may be done using different modes, describing how the al-
gorithm should encrypt a message, that is split in blocks of fixed size. The Electronic
CodeBook (ECB) mode encrypts two identical blocks into two identical ciphered blocks,
introducing redundancy in the encrypted message, which makes it easier for an attacker
to decrypt the message.
Goal: The UECBISE operator tries to weaken the confidentiality of symmetrically encrypted
data by easing its decryption using ECB mode.
Specification: It detects the usage of a symmetric encryption algorithm and replaces its mode
by ECB.
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Removing authentication mechanisms:
In this section, we present an operator removing authentication mechanisms that are present
in the code of a Web Service for instance.
Remove host name verification (RHNV).
Context: A web application needing to authenticate its clients may verify their host names,
usually after a successful SSL handshake.
Goal: The RHNV operator removes this authentication, making the application vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks.
Specification: It removes standard methods used to authenticate clients using their host names.
4.3 Implementation details
In this section, we give implementation details about PIT in order to support future research
using the tool. Hence, PIT’s mutation operators’ design was not imagined to be able to perform
complex mutations and we hope that this contribution will help those that are reluctant to use
the tool at first glance. We also give more details about the precise behavior of our mutation
operators, in order to support future improvements of our work.
PIT is a JAVA mutation testing tool working at byte-code level, i.e it does not have to com-
pile its mutants but rather mutates the code of the program under test at byte-code level. The
tool relies strongly on a byte-code manipulation library named ASM for its mutation operators’
implementation. Hence, the library proposes JAVA objects that read a class byte-code and
write what they have read in a buffer. However, these objects may be tuned in order to modify
what they write on specific byte-code lecture. This enables to create mutation operators, that
trigger mutations simultaneously while the reading a class and writing a mutant (see figure 4.2).
In PIT, the library was used to go through the byte-code of a class under test, identify
method declaration parts of the class, and read line by line the code of the identified methods
while triggering mutations on the go.
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Figure 4.2: ASM objects that are reading Foo.class’s byte-code and triggering a mutation
while the lecture is ongoing.
Foo.class
Byte code lecture
Byte code lecture
Byte code lecture
Byte code lecture
Byte code lecture
Foo.class
Mutant
ASM objects specifically tuned in order to 
represent a Mutation Operator
Should I mutate this? … no
Mutation writing
Byte code writing
Byte code writing
Byte code writing
Byte code writing
Should I mutate this? … no
Should I mutate this? … no
Should I mutate this? … no
Should I mutate this? … yes ! Mutated byte code
ASM4 implements the features we just described in the following way.
First, it proposes to use a ClassReader, a class to which a programmer can pass byte-code by
using the constructors of the class, e.g ClassReader(byte[] b) or ClassReader(InputStream
is). In PIT, the ClassReader is used to read the byte-code of the program under test.
The ClassReader extends the ClassVisitor class which follows the visitor design pattern,
and that is used to visit byte-code JAVA classes. Moreover, the ClassVisitor owns some meth-
ods like visit(int version, int access, String name, String signature, String su
perName, String[] interfaces) to visit the header of a class, visitAnnotation(String
desc, boolean visible) to visit the annotation of a class, or visitMethod(int access,
String name, String desc, String signature, String[] exceptions) to visit a method
of a class. The visit methods can be very fine grained. Hence, there is a visit method for almost
any byte-code instruction composing a JAVA class. The attributes passed to a visit method
are filled during the lecture of the byte-code of a class.
4The ASM JAVA byte code manipulation framework is detailed at http://asm.ow2.org/, the website provides
several tutorials and a user guide. In this work, we used the fourth version of the library.
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Next, it offers the possibility to connect a ClassVisitor to another one by providing the
first with the reference of the other. In this case, whenever the first ClassVisitor visits some
code by calling one of its visit method, it also calls the same visit method of the other. The
real benefit of connecting ClassVisitor’s is to create a chain of visitors by the following way
(see figure 4.3).
1. First, create a ClassReader. Then, connect one ClassVisitor to this ClassReader.
Hence, while the ClassReader reads the class under test, the visitX methods of its parent
are called. Therefore, the ClassReader sends anything it visits to the ClassVisitor to
which it is connected.
2. Then, create a specific ClassVisitor named ClassWriter that aims at writing anything
it visits in a byte-code array. Finally, connect the ClassWriter to the ClassVisitor.
Figure 4.3: A chain of ClassVisitor’s reading Foo.class bytecode.
ClassVisitor ClassWriterClassReaderFoo.class
I saw this byte code line I saw this byte code line
Foo.class
This gives us a chain of ClassVisitors and anything being read by the ClassReader is
writen by the ClassWriter. Should we modify the ClassVisitor lying between the ClassReader
and the ClassWriter, we could make the ClassWriter write alterated versions of the class being
read. The default behavior of a ClassVisitor is to send anything it visits to the ClassWriter,
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as we explained before. Hence, it calls the visit method of the ClassReader after visiting him-
self the code that the ClassReader orders him to visit. By creating a child of a ClassVisitor
and by overriding one of the inherited visit methods, one can create a stop point in the lecture
of the class that is triggered by the overidden visit method. Thus, this stop point is triggered
by a specific byte-code instruction being read. In the core of the overriden visit method, a
programmer may define additionnal byte-code instructions to send to the ClassWriter. Or, a
programmer may also suppress the call to the ClassWriter in order to delete instructions that
the ClassWriter should write. Henry Coles [3] exploits this idea by extending a ClassVisitor
class for each mutation operator he created. Hence, in the core of the overriden methods, he
states the byte-code to be added or to be removed, his custom class forming a ready-to-go
mutation operator (see figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: A chain of ClassVisitor’s reading Foo.class bytecode and mutating it when
reading specific byte code lines.
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child
= 
mutation operator
ClassWriterClassReaderFoo.class
I saw this byte code line
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mutated byte code line
Foo.class
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mutate this
byte code 
line?
No, I send this non modified
byte code line
MutantOf
Foo.class
Moreover, the ClassVisitor’s lying between the ClassReader and the ClassWriter are
very specific in PIT as those are MethodVisitor’s. A MethodVisitor is a class that works
in the same way as ClassVisitor’s, but is specifically designed to read byte-code instructions
lying in methods. Therefore, PIT’s mutation operators are restrained to modifications of in-
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structions lying inside methods of the class-under-test.
Although ASM is very powerful, it was engineered focusing on performance. Therefore, the
library is usually used by performing a single reading of a class and triggering the modifications
on the go. This has a serious impact on the mutation operators’ implementation possibilities.
Hence, one cannot perform very complex changes using the library. For instance, the removal
of a code pattern conditioned by another code pattern that must appear later in the class under
lecture is impossible to describe.
In the next sub-sections, we state the implementation of each of our mutation operators.
Note that in 4.2, for each abstract mutation operator, we supplied one specification. However,
this specification could be satisfied in many ways. Hence, for instance, there are many ways to
use Message Digests in JAVA but we limited ourselves to the standard java.util.Digest to
replace secured digests with MD5 (UWMD). In our research, we usually limited ourselves to
one implementation supplied for each specification but many others should be considered for
the future work.
Replacing secured objects with unsecured
UPPRNG: Use Predictable Pseudo Random Number Generator
The mutation operator replaces any call of secureRandom.nextBytes(byteArray) by
(new Random).nextBytes(byteArray) where secureRandom is an instanciated SecureRandom
object.
The use of Random instead of SecureRandom injects a predictable pseudo random number gen-
erator use. This mutation operator can therefore lead to weaknesses in secure communications
or encryption. Thus, it facilitates the work of the attacker.
UWMD: Use Weak Message Digest
This mutation operator replaces any call to new MessageDigest("X") constructor by new
MessageDigest("MD5"). The java.security.MessageDigest class provides the functional-
ity of a message digest algorithm, such as SHA-1, SHA-256 or MD5. One specifies the desired
algorithm with the String X passed to the constructor. In the implementation of our opera-
tor, X represents any string. Therefore, the operator may lead to equivalent mutants when X
is already MD5. This operator can introduce weaknesses in hashes because of high collision
inherent to the MD5 hashing function.
44
REIS: Remove Encryption In Socket
Operator that replaces an instance of (Socket) SSLSocketFactory.getDefault().create
Socket("address", portNumber) by (Socket) SocketFactory.getDefault().createSocke
t("address", 80). This operator will create a Socket that uses HTTP instead of HTTPS.
It can lead to unencrypted communications that can be read by an attacker intercepting the
network traffic.
PSQLI: Permit Sql Injection
Mutation operator that replaces the initialization and the execution of a PreparedStatement
by the initialization and execution of a Statement, thus enabling SQL injection.
For the operator to be applied, the following pattern must be found in one method:
PreparedStatement preparedStatement =
connection.prepareStatement("querryContainingOneOrSeveral’?’");
preparedStatement.setX1(1, value_1);
.
.
.
preparedStatement.setXn(n, value_n);
// where Xi are in {Float, Double, Boolean, Long, String, Int}
preparedStatement.execute() or executeQuerry() or executeUpdate();
The operator will only change the last line of the pattern to
connection.createStatement().execute("querry where ’?’ are replaced by the val
ues set before").
Hence, the operator keeps the assignments of each input value in the PreparedStatement
e.g when it recognizes a updateSales.setString or a updateSales.setInt, etc.
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For instance,
PreparedStatement updateSales = conn.prepareStatement("update COFFEES set SALES = ?
where COF_NAME = ?");
updateSales.setInt(1, nbSales);
updateSales.setString(2, coffeeName);
updateSales.execute();
will be mutated to
PreparedStatement updateSales = conn.prepareStatement("update COFFEES set SALES = ?
where COF_NAME = ?");
updateSales.setInt(1, nbSales);
updateSales.setString(2, coffeeName);
conn.createStatement().execute("update COFFEES set SALES = ’"+nbSales+"’ where
COF_NAME = ’"+coffeeName+"’");
This mutation operator can lead to SQL injections because of the security a PreparedState
ment proposes and that a Statement does not support. Hence, a PreparedStatement sends
the precomputed query without its inputs (coffeeName and nbSales) to the DBMS. Then, the
DBMS waits for the inputs that are sent in a second step in order to finalize the construction of
the query and execute it. In a Statement, the query is built with its inputs before sending it as a
String to the DBMS. Thus, an attacker may insert SQL code in the inputs in order to modify
the result of the query. For instance, giving the following character sequence coffeeName
= "randomName’ or ’a’=’a"; for the coffeeName input will update all the SALES of the
COFFEES.
Removing security features on JAVA objects
XMLPVXXE : Make XML parser vulnerable to XML eXternal Entity attack
This operator has two different implementations. Hence, there are several ways to create XML
parsers’. In our research, we considered two different implementations for this operator. One
implementation removes a DDOS sanitizing feature on org.xml.sax.XMLReader, the second
achieves the same operation on a javax.xml.parsers.SAXParserFactory that is used to create
a javax.xml.parsers.SAXParser.
XMLReader’s implementation : The mutation operator injects XMLReader.setFeature("
http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", false); before any call of
XMLReader.parse(InputSource). This operator will make the XMLReader vulnerable to XXE
attacks if it parses input from an external source.
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SAXParser’s implementation : The mutation operator injects saxParserFactory.set
Feature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", false); before any
call of saxParserFactory.newSAXParser().
This operator will make any SAXParser created by saxParserFactory vulnerable to XXE
attacks.
XMLPVXEE : Make XML parser vulnerable to XML eXternal Entity Expansion
attack
Similarly to XMLPXXE, this operator has two different implementations.
XMLReader’s implementation : The mutation operator injects xmlReader.setFeature(
XMLConstants.FEATURE SECURE PROCESSING, false); before any call of xmlReader.parse(
InputSource);.
The call of xmlReader.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE SECURE PROCESSING, false); will
disable the checking for DOS attacks before parsing. Therefore, the operator will make an
XMLReader vulnerable to DOS attacks.
SAXParser’s implementation : The mutation operator injects saxParserFactory.setF
eature(XMLConstants.FEATURE SECURE PROCESSING, false); before any call of saxParserF
actory.newSAXParser().
The call of saxParserFactory.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE SECURE PROCESSING, false)
will disable the checking for DOS attacks before the SAXParser created parses. This mutation
operator will make any SAXParser created by the saxParserFactory vulnerable to DOS at-
tacks.
UC : Unsecure Cookie
This operator specifically aims at creating unsecured cookies in a server’s code. The operator re-
moves any call of cookie.setSecure(true); wherecookie is a javax.servlet.http.Cookie.
The instruction cookie.setSecure(true) orders to add a flag to the cookie disallowing a
browser that receives it to send it back in an insecure communication. This mutation operator
can thus enable attackers to read private information stocked in cookies, if they intercept the
communication.
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RHTTPOFC : Remove HTTP-Only Flag from Cookie
This operator specifically aims at creating unsecured cookies in a server’s code. This mutation
operator removes any call of cookie.setHttpOnly(true); where cookie is a javax.servlet.
http.Cookie. The method cookie.setHttpOnly(true); adds a flag to the cookie sent by the
server to the browser, ordering the browser to make sure that the cookie can not be read by a
malicious script. This mutation operator can lead to session hijackings using cross-site scripting.
Weakening encryption algorithms
URSAWSK : Use RSA With Short Key
This mutation operator makes the program use a small key for RSA encryption (512bits) where
a secured-size (>=2048bits) key was used.
First, the operator mutates the initialization of the key. Moreover, it replaces any call to
keyPairGenerator.initialize(X); where X>=2048 by keyPairGenerator.initialize(512);.
Here, keyPairGenerator is a java.security.KeyPairGenerator.
In a MethodVisitor, the only way to know that the KeyPairGenerator is for RSA-use
is to have the creation of the KeyPairGenerator in the same method as its initialization.
Hence, KeyPairGenerator’s declare the algorithm they are used for at construction, e.g by
using keyPairGenerator = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA");. Therefore, the muta-
tion operator is applied only if it can find the construction keyPairGenerator = KeyPairGener
ator.getInstance("RSA") in the same method and before the initialization.
As explained before, this mutation operator can lead to weaknesses in RSA-secured communi-
cations. For instance, it facilitates a brute force attack.
UBFWSK : Use Blowfish With Short Key
This mutation operator makes the program use a small key for BLOWFISH encryption (64bits)
where a secured-size key (>=128bits) was used.
It replaces an initialization keyGenerator.init(X); where X>=128 by keyGenerator.init(64).
In a MethodVisitor, the only way to know that the KeyGenerator is for BLOWFISH-use is to
have the construction of the javax.crypto.KeyGenerator in the same method as its initial-
ization. Hence, KeyGenerator’s declare the algorithm they are used for at construction, e.g by
using keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("BLOWFISH");.
Therefore ,the mutation operator is applied only if it can find the construction keyGenerator =
KeyGenerator.getInstance("BLOWFISH"); in the same method and before its initialization.
As stated before, this operator can lead to weaknesses in BLOWFISH-secured communications,
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it facilitates a brute force attack for instance.
Removing standard sanitization functions
RPTS : Remove Path Traversal Sanitization
The operator removes any call to the user-input-sanitization method org.apache.commons.
io.FilenameUtils.getName(name);.
Hence, FilenameUtils.getName(name) method works in the following way:
if name = "a/b/c.txt",
FilenameUtils.getName(name) will return "c.txt".
The sanitization method prevents an attacker from accessing to the folders inside the one to
which a simple user has access. This mutation operator can therefore lead to path traversal
vulnerabilities.
RRS : Remove Regex Sanitization
For this mutation operator, we provide two implementations. The first mutates Pattern’s, the
second mutates calls to the String.matches(String regex) method.
Implementation using Patterns : One way to use regex’s in JAVA is to use the java.util
.regex.Pattern class. It is used in the following way:
Pattern p = Pattern.compile("a*b");
Matcher m = p.matcher("aaaaab");
boolean b = m.matches(); // b contains true
The Pattern defines the regular expression to be matched by using Pattern.compile(String
regex). Then, a matcher is created by using p.matcher(CharSequence input), the input con-
taining a CharSequence that should be verified against the regex. Finally, a boolean stocks
the check that the CharSequence matches the regex.
We designed a mutation operator that replaces any call to p.matches(regex) by p.matches
(dummyRegex). The regex dummyRegex is designed to let anything pass except from one rare
unicode character.
The result is that the mutation operator can suppress input sanitization and facilitate an attack.
Implementation using String.matches method : Another way to use regex’s in JAVA
is to use the java.lang.String.matches(String regex) method. It is used in the following
way:
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String expression = "aaaaaab";
boolean b = expression.matches("a*b"); // b contains true
The input to verify is stocked in expression. Then, the method matches is used to check
whether the expression matches a regex.
We design a mutation operator that replaces any call of String.matches("aProperRegex")
by String.matches("dummyRegex"). The dummy regex is the same as in the previous imple-
mentation.
The result is thus the same as in the previous implementation, the mutation operator can
suppress input sanitization and therefore, facilitate an attack.
Replacing strong with weak encryption algorithms:
UDESISE : Use DES In Symmetric Encryption
The mutation operator’s implementation replaces the creation and initialization of a secure
symmetric encryption object (javax.crypto.Cipher) by the creation and initialization of the
object, modified to use Data Encryption Standard (DES). Hence, javax.crypto.Cipher may
be used in the following way:
// creation of the Cipher
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("SECUREALGORITHM/MODE/PADDING");
// initialization of the Cipher
c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE or Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key);
// use of the Cipher
c.doFinal(...) or c.update(...);
First, the Cipher is created by using getInstance method. getInstance takes as a String
parameter the specification of algorithm that the Cipher should encompass. When this method
is called, the Security Provider of the application’s JAVA runtime environment is called to pro-
vide a correct implementation of the specified encryption algorithm. We do not aim in this work
at explaining how these mechanisms work in JAVA but we rather refer to the interested reader
to a JAVA security guide5. Next, the Cipher is initialized for encryption or decryption by using
init(Cipher.ENCRYPT MODE,key) or init(Cipher.DECRYPT MODE,key), respectively. Finally,
5ORACLE provides a guide that documents how the security providers are used in JAVA on the following
web-page http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/guides/security/overview/jsoverview.html
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the Cipher is used to encrypt or decrypt text by using doFinal(...) or update(...). We do
not give the parameters of the last two methods as their different implementations are numerous.
As all our mutation operators are MethodVisitor’s, the following pattern that is found in
the core of a method triggers the mutation:
// creation of the Cipher
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("SECUREALGORITHM/MODE/PADDING");
// initialization of the Cipher
c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT\_MODE or Cipher.DECRYPT\_MODE, key);
Thus, the operator mutates both lines by the following code:
// creation of a DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding Cipher
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding");
// initialization of the Cipher with a DES specific key that is 64 bits long
c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,new SecretKeySpec(key.getEncoded()\allowbreak,0,8,"DES"));
The method key.getEncoded() returns the byte array of the key. The call to new SecretKeySpec
(key.getEncoded(),0,8,"DES") creates a javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec, a key spec-
ified for DES use. The SecretKeySpec is created by truncating the previously used key to 64
bits, a standard size for a DES key. Thus, the Cipher is mutated to encrypt or decrypt DES
text’s and its initialization is in accordance with its usage. Hence, if we do not mutate the
second line, the usage of the Cipher could throw an Exception at run-time, because the key
in parameter could have a inappropriate size for DES use.
Because DES is known to be insecure, this mutation operator can lead to weaknesses in
symmetric encryption.
Unfortunately, we could not find a way to implement this operator correctly in PIT without
modifying significantly the tool’s implementation. As such a modification could lead to errors
in other parts of the tool, we tested our implementation’s draft in another project and it gave
us promising results. Therefore, we left the operator in the core of this thesis, as it highlights
the issue in PIT and to introduce its specification in the security-aware mutation operators.
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UECBISE : Use ECB In Symmetric Encryption
Again, this mutation operator mutates Cipher objects. Hence, it replaces any initialization of a
Cipher, Cipher.getInstance("X/Y/Z") where Y is not "ECB" by Cipher.getInstance("X/ECB/Z").
If Y and Z are empty, the operator replaces the initialization by Cipher.getInstance("X/ECB/P
KCS5Padding).
The ECB mode means that if two plain-text blocks are identical, the obtained cipher-text blocks
will also be identical. The padding is a default padding.
This mutation operator can thus lead to weaknesses in encryption. Therefore, it facilitates
the decryption of a ciphered-text by an attacker by introducind a pattern redundancy in the
encrypted messages.
Removing authentication mechanisms:
RHNV : Remove Host Name Verification
This mutation operator replaces any verification of a HostName using (boolean) HostnameVe
rifier.verify(String hostname, SSLSession session) by true.
Hence, to use javax.net.ssl.HostNameVerifier.verify is a standard way to “verify that
the host name is an acceptable match with the server’s authentication scheme” [46].
HostNameVerifier is an Interface and, usually, the method HostNameVerifier.verify’s
implementation verifies the certificate of the host specified by its host-name in the SSLSession
before returning true or false.
This operator can thus lead to vulnerabilities in the authentication process of a program since
the mutant accepts any host.
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Chapter 5
Experimentation & Discussion
In this chapter, we describe our experimentation in section 5.1 and discuss the results in section
5.2.
5.1 Experimentation
In this section, we first derive the problem discussed in chapter 3 into four formal research
questions. Then, we state the experimentation process we followed to answer these questions
in section 5.1.2. Finally, in the sub-section 5.1.3, we present the case studies we experimented
on.
5.1.1 Deriving research questions from the problem
In chapter 3, we stated the following problems :
1. Non security-aware mutation operators are unlikely to incidentally generate vulnerable
mutants.
2. Mutation operators specialized in introducing vulnerabilities at code level were never
experimented before.
In this thesis, we aim at resolving these problems. Therefore, we verify the relevance of a
new set of security-aware mutation operators, specifically tuned for introducing vulnerabilities.
For demonstrability, we focus on the JAVA language, which is very popular in web development
and other security-sensible areas of development. Nevertheless, the first step is to validate our
intuition, check that standard mutation operators are indeed unlikely to generate vulnerable
mutants. Here, we chose to focus on the mutation operators implemented in a very popular
mutation tool named PITest. This interrogation leads us to state the first research question
(RQ):
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(RQ1) Are the standard operators of PIT likely to introduce vulnerabilities?
Next, we explore potential operators, inspiring ourselves on the expertise of a security static
analyzer (Findbugs-sec). Then, we implement those operators in PITest. The next step is to
verify our operators’ ability to introduce real vulnerabilities in real projects. This leads us to
state our second research question:
(RQ2) Does our mutation operators introduce detectable vulnerabilities?
Then, as one of the major problems in mutation testing is the number of mutants generated
but is also the main guarantee of generating quality test-suites, we explore the prevalence
of our mutation operators in open source projects. This indeed aims at assessing operators
applicability and can help prioritizing their application. Resuming our idea leads us to the
RQ3.
(RQ3) How prevalent are these types of faults on open source projects?
Finally, we explore a last but not the less important question. What if the vulnerabilities
our operators introduce were actually redundant with the faults standard mutation operators
introduce? This fact could limit our operators’ value compared to the standard ones. Therefore,
we investigate this potential threat in our last research question, RQ4.
(RQ4) Are the vulnerabilities introduced easily killed by fault oriented test suites?
In the next section, we detail the experimentation process that we followed in order to
answer our four research questions.
5.1.2 Experimentation process
During our experimentation, we first began by investigating the possibility of creating the
security-aware mutation operators. After the exploration of the state of the art summarized in
chapter 2, we took inspiration on security static analyzers, tools capable of highlighting vulner-
able patterns in the code of an application (see chapter 2). Indeed, if we are provided with both
a vulnerability pattern at the code level and its fix, we are able to design a mutation operator
introducing the vulnerable code. In this thesis, we focused on the vulnerable code patterns
that FindBugs-sec was able to identify and reverted those manually in order to construct our
mutation operators that introduce the vulnerable code patterns.
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Then, we implemented those operators in the PITest mutation tool. We detailed our oper-
ators definition and implementation in chapter 4.
Next, we wanted to verify our operators and in a reproducible and automatic way. Also, we
wanted to evaluate our operators’ usage in real world applications. Therefore, we found four
open-source projects, two web applications and two bit-torrent clients (applications that should
be concerned with security) and generated their mutants according to our mutation operators.
More details about the case studies will be given in the next section 5.1.3. Then, we launched
FindBugs on each mutated class and on its mutants to generate FinbBugs standard reports.
The final step was to compare the report of the class to the reports of its mutant in order to
verify the correct introduction of the vulnerabilities in the mutants. This part of the process
gave us the opportunity to answer to RQ2 and RQ3.
Using the same automated process but using PIT’s original set of operators to generate the
mutants, we could answer RQ1. Hence, we generated the mutants of one of our open source
applications then assessed the number of vulnerabilities introduced in the application using
FindBugs, again.
Finally, we focused on our last research question. We could find a high coverage test suite
for one of our open source web applications. By using PIT mutation tool restricted to our
mutation operators and allowing it to run this test suite, we could answer RQ4.
5.1.3 Case studies
iTrust
iTrust1 is a web application developed and maintained by the students of NCState University
and consists of 24,785 lines of code. It provides a platform accessible to patients and doctors,
to keep track of the patient’s medical history. The project available to the public insuring its
accessibility by providing instructions for its installation2.
Vuze Azureus
Vuze3 is a popular open-source Bittorrent client, consisting of 186,247 lines of code.
1https://sourceforge.net/projects/itrust/ (version 21.0.01)
2http://agile.csc.ncsu.edu/iTrust/wiki/doku.php?id=home_deployment_instructions
3https://sourceforge.net/projects/azureus/ (version 5.7.40)
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Open-Legislation
OpenLegislation4 is an open source web application developed and maintained by the New York
State Senate. The goal of this application is to give access to several NYS’s data including bills,
resolutions and laws. It consists of 912 classes and is 33,819 lines of code
Ants Peer-to-Peer
Ant’s Peer-to-Peer is an open-source Bittorrent client5 (consisting of 19,399 lines of code), like
Vuze.
5.2 Discussion
This section discusses the results we obtained by following the process detailed in section 5.1.2.
In order to organize the discussion, we go through the results by answering every research
questions that we stated in section 5.1.1.
5.2.1 RQ1: Are PIT’s default operators likely to produce vulnerabilities?
For the exploration of this research question, we generated iTrust’s mutants using PIT, re-
stricted to its default set of mutation operators. Then, we ran FindBugs coupled to its sec-plugin
to investigate the presence of vulnerabilities in the mutants. We specifically tuned FindBugs to
check every potential issue, even those of low confidence, at the cost of performance. Because
of the high number of mutants generated for iTrust’s project (more than 44000) and the time
required to analyze one mutant (on average two minutes), we restricted the set of classes to
mutate to 33 classes.
As shown in table 5.1, PIT generated a set of 5486 mutants containing only two vulnerabil-
ities. Both vulnerabilities were related to SQL injection, and were detected on a mutant where
the mutation removed a method call and on another mutant where the mutation removed a
conditional execution. Although PIT’s standard set of operators was indeed able to introduce
vulnerabilities, their number appears to be low considering the required generation and run
time of the mutants. We therefore conclude that PIT’s standard mutation operator set doesn’t
suit security test suites evaluation, the efforts required to generate and evaluate the mutants
largely outweigh the meagre benefits in terms of introduced vulnerabilities.
4https://github.com/nysenate/OpenLegislation (version 2.2)
5https://sourceforge.net/projects/antsp2p/ (version beta1.6.0)
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Table 5.1: We mutated iTrust with PIT’s standard mutation operator set. The table records
the number of mutants and vulnerabilities that were generated for each operator. The vulner-
abilities’ presence relays on FindBugs and its security plugin.
Operator name #mutants #Vulnerabilities
ArgumentPropagationMutator 42 0
ConditionalsBoundaryMutator 48 0
ConstructorCallMutator 431 0
IncrementsMutator 12 0
InlineConstantMutator 696 0
MathMutator 41 0
MemberVariableMutator 83 0
NegateConditionalsMutator 368 0
NonVoidMethodCallMutator 1539 1
RemoveConditionalMutator EQUAL ELSE 320 0
RemoveConditionalMutator EQUAL IF 320 0
RemoveConditionalMutator ORDER ELSE 48 0
RemoveConditionalMutator ORDER IF 48 1
RemoveIncrementsMutator 12 0
RemoveSwitchMutator 15 0
ReturnValsMutator 289 0
SwitchMutator 2 0
VoidMethodCallMutator 1172 0
Total 5486 2
5.2.2 RQ2: Are our mutation operators likely to produce vulnerabilities?
Now that we know that PIT’s standard set of mutation operators is not suitable for security
testing, our next research question investigates the extend to which our set of operators can do
better, i.e introduce more vulnerabilities. The first step required by this task is to verify our
mutations operators’ capability in introducing vulnerabilities.
To assess this problem, we first used the same generation and checking technique as in 5.2.1:
we generated the mutants using PIT and evaluated the number of vulnerabilities introduced
with FindBugs. PIT’s engine was this time restricted to our set of mutation operators. To per-
form the experiment, we manually created a sample project containing several classes, each one
implemented to trigger one specific mutation, accordingly to our set of security aware operators.
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Due to the possibility of false positives inherent to static analyzers, we also manually imple-
mented a security test suite able to kill every (non equivalent) mutant we introduce. Overall,
we exploited an hybrid analysis composed of a static and a dynamic analysis to verify the in-
troduction of vulnerabilities. The static and dynamic analysis combined can be seen as a sanity
check. The dynamic analysis also assessed the fact that the mutation operators introduced
useable (killable) mutants.
Static analysis:
Table 5.2 reports FindBugs’ results on our sample project. RRS and UDESISE were not evalu-
ated. We chose not to evaluate RRS because it was not inspired by a FindBugs pattern, and
could therefore not be found by FindBugs. Regarding UDESISE, the operator’s implementation
is currently experimental in PIT, as the tool wasn’t designed to perform higher order mutation.
Overall, we can see that 9/13 (nearly 70%) operators generated a vulnerability that could
be found by FindBugs. We list the non-recognition causes of the 30% remaining.
• Remove Certificate Verification (RCV) The vulnerability is actually well intro-
duced. Hence, HostNameVerifier.verify(...)’s result was replaced by true in the
mutant. The vulnerability was not recognized because FindBugs identified a vulnerable
HostNameVerifier based on the HostNameVerifier’s code, not it’s usage. Indeed, for Find-
Bugs, a vulnerable HostNameVerifier is identified by a constant return true; in all its
.verify(...) methods.
• Xml Parser Vunerable to XXE/XEE (XMLPVXXE/XMLPVXEE) The vulner-
ability is also well introduced because the operator removed a secure parsing feature on
an XML reader. However, the secure original program contained the line:
XMLReader.setFeature(SecurizingFeature, true)
preceding a parsing. Thus, the mutant contained the following code:
XMLReader.setFeature(SecurizingFeature, true);
XMLReader.setFeature(SecurizingFeature, false);
XMLReader.parse(input);
Our hypothesis is that FindBugs analysed the first line to directly return that the vul-
nerability was handled by the programmer.
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• Remove Encryption In Socket (REIS) The manual verification of the vulnerability’s
introduction led us to conclude that FindBugs’ identification pattern is limited to the
following one:
Socket s = new Socket(address,port);
The problem is that we introduced an equivalent code using a different pattern.
Socket s = SocketFactory.getDefault().createSocket(address,port);
We assume that the two manners of creating an unsecured socket are equivalent after
inspection of createSocket(...) method’s specification.
Table 5.2: Injected classes of vulnerabilities that were identified by FindBugs (with the security
plugin), in a sample project. We mutated this project and verified the presence of vulnerabilities
by comparing the static analysis reports of the mutants and the original programs. YES signifies
that the injected vulnerability was identified by FindBugs.
UPPNRG RPTSF UWMD RCV XMLPVXXE
Recognized? YES YES YES NO NO
XMLPVXEE REIS UC RHTTPOFC URSAWSK
Recognized? NO NO YES YES YES
UBFWSK PSQLI UDESISE UECBISE RRS
Recognized? YES YES / YES /
Dynamic analysis:
After designing and writing our test suite, we used PIT’s entire mutation tool, to generate the
mutants with respect to our operators and ran those against a custom-made security test suite.
The table 5.3 subsumes our results.
First, it is noteworthy that all the analysis-considered mutants were killed by the security
test suite. This is a very good result as we dreaded the difficulty of finding the introduced
security faults. We prove that killing the mutants introduced is actually feasible. Therefore,
this experience insures that the mutants introduced are actually usable in the improvement
process of a test-suite.
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Table 5.3: Injected classes of vulnerabilities that were identified by a custom-made security
test-suite in a sample project. We mutated this project and verified the presence of vulnerabil-
ities by running a custom-made security test-suite against the mutants. YES signifies that the
injected vulnerability was identified by the suite.
UPPNRG RPTSF UWMD RCV XMLPVXXE
Recognized? YES YES YES YES YES
XMLPVXEE REIS UC RHTTPOFC URSAWSK
Recognized? YES YES YES YES YES
UBFWSK PSQLI UDESISE UECBISE RRS
Recognized? YES YES / YES YES
Although it is not reported in the tables, the operators also generated (living) equivalent
mutants. However, this fact does not affect the results since equivalent mutants are a problem
inherent to mutation testing.
Conclusion:
With regards to the previous sub sections’ results, we are now able to answer our second re-
search question. We show that we were able to introduce vulnerabilities with our mutation
operators with a double check, a static analysis that could find 70% of the vulnerabilities and
a dynamic analysis that could identify all the generated vulnerabilities. The dynamic analy-
sis eliminates the static analyzer’s false positives and eliminates its false negatives for REIS,
XMLPVXEE, XMLPVXEE and RCV. The false negatives either come from the static analyzer’s in-
completeness (REIS) or optimisations (XMLPVXXE/XMLPVXEE). Although our mutation operators
were inspired by FindBugs patterns, the vulnerabilities they produced were not all found by
the tool. Therefore, it suggests that our operators could have another applicability in static
analysis tools’ validation.
5.2.3 RQ3: How prevalent are the vulnerabilities in open source projects?
The last research question responds partly to the effectiveness comparison between our muta-
tion operators and PIT’s standard set in the goal of generating vulnerabilities. After answering
RQ1 and RQ2, we state that PIT’s set of operator is not suitable for security testing improve-
ment and that our mutation operators introduce real vulnerabilities. To end with this point,
we now would like to assess the vulnerabilities’ prevalence in real projects.
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In the next experiment, we use PIT, restricted to our mutation operators, on four open
source projects. Table 5.4 displays the results obtained.
Table 5.4: We mutated open source projects with new operators using PIT. The purpose was
to assess the prevalence of security-oriented mutants.
iTrust VUZE OPENLEGISLATION ANTSP2P
#classes in input 405 4669 912 406
#lines in input 24,785 186,247 33,819 19,399
#classes mutated 33 30 57 9
#mutants generated 62 57 154 18
First, we notice that the number of vulnerabilities introduced does not depend on the size of
the considered project. Hence, iTrust and Vuze have a comparable number of security oriented
mutants whereas their size is significantly different. This is an interesting result since tradi-
tional mutation operators are known to exponentially generate mutants while increasing the
size of the projects on which they are applied. The fact that we do not have the same behavior
highlights the nature of our security-aware mutation operators. Hence, our operators aim at
testing security, which is a non-functional requirement whereas traditional mutation operators
aim at testing functional requirements. Therefore, the number of mutants that will be gener-
ated using our operators will increase only if the security of the SUT increases, disregarding all
the functional increments that could be made to the SUT.
While we used manual code review, we also noted that since iTrust followed the same de-
sign for a large amount of its database interaction, the feature-corresponding mutation pattern
(PSQLI ) was triggered in a significant proportion. This is an interesting result if it is general-
izable. Hence, if developers tend to develop pieces of code having a similar purpose in a similar
way, the tester can be confident to have tested a large amount of security feature instances in
the project under test by using our mutation operators.
More generally, we observe the relative generated vulnerabilities’ prevalence. Hence, vul-
nerabilities are hard to find in real world projects, giving the tester too few examples to get
experience with. Having these amounts, 62, 57, 154 and 18 of vulnerabilities available in an
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acceptable time (the generation never took more than 10 minutes) can be estimated valuable
for security testers.
To compare the prevalence of vulnerabilities generated with our mutation operators to
PIT’s standard set, let us state that every vulnerability we generate was detected by FindBugs,
whereas it took the generation of more than 5000 mutants to generate two vulnerabilities for
iTrust, using PIT’s standard operators (see RQ2 ). Therefore, we are confident for the appli-
cability and the scalability of the security aware operators we propose, in comparison to what
was available before.
Table 5.5 details the mutation operators generating the set of mutants which we just have
been discussing for each open source project.
Table 5.5: Number of security-aware mutants generated on four open source projects. The
table entries record the number of mutants generated per mutation operator and project. Non
referenced operators did not produce any mutants.
UPPNRG UWMD PSQLI UECBISE RRS TOTAL
ITRUST 1 0 39 0 22 62
VUZE 8 2 0 9 38 57
OPENLEGISLATION 0 0 0 0 154 154
ANTSP2P 2 4 0 11 1 18
First, we can observe that there are disparities in the mutants’ frequencies, classified by the
mutation operator applied. Hence, RSS seems to find applications easily while UPPNRG hardly
finds an application in every project. We also note that only four mutation operators were
useful in four open source projects’ review. However, as PSQLI demonstrates, an operator can
be useless in several projects and highly demonstrate its value in another.
Yet, we assume that RSS’s “popularity” is also understandable regarding its frequency in
web applications. A regex sanitization, is understandably more common than a Blowfish usage,
for instance.
We therefore conclude that many security-aware faults appear in the selected projects.
Though, we note that further case studies are required to certify these first results on the
prevalence of our operators.
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5.2.4 RQ4: Ease of killing vulnerabilities introduced with fault-oriented test
suites
The previous research questions assess the usability of the new mutation operators in order to
improve security test suites. As we know, vulnerabilities form a subset of the possible faults in
a program. If existing fault-oriented test suites can kill the mutants generated accordingly to
security operators, there is no real need to use these operators.
To assess the research question following this interrogation, we used iTrust’s test suite com-
posed of more than 2200 tests cases and ran those (using PIT) against the 62 mutants we
generated, accordingly to our mutation operators. The mutation coverage report is detailed in
the following table.
Table 5.6: We ran 62 mutants generated using our mutation operators on iTrust against 2254
(fault finding oriented) test cases available in iTrust. We achieved this using PIT and this table
details the mutation coverage report resulting the experiment.
Mutation operator number of mutants
no coverage (total) 5
RRS 1
PSQLI 4
survived (total) 44
RRS 8
PSQLI 35
UPPNRG 1
killed (total) 13
RRS 13
Total 62
A first observation is that a minority of mutants where killed (≈21%). Although the exper-
iment should be repeated on other projects to assess the result’s representativeness, we believe
it indicates that fault-oriented test suites cannot find easily the vulnerabilities we introduce.
Therefore, we conclude that the set of mutation operators we propose suits its purpose to in-
troduce new types of faults, killable by specialized (security) test suites only.
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We remark that, after manual reviewing the killed mutants, we found that those were killed
by regex testing suites. However, the suites did not seem to follow defined rules of design, and
did not appear being desingned to assess application’s security.
5.2.5 Threats to validity
Internal validity
Our conclusions may be threatened by the used tools. The mutation operators we proposed
were implemented in PIT mutation tool, in which all the mutation operators rely on bytecode
manipulation. Hence, PIT articulates the ASM JAVA bytecode framework as an abstraction
layer for the mutant generation, forcing the developer to follow this line while designing their
new mutation operators. The byte code manipulation being an extra difficulty to manage while
implementing the mutation operators, potential defects might influence our results. However,
we used code review on the operators’ implementation and manually inspected the generated
mutants during every experiment. Furthermore, the static and dynamic analysis we performed
in RQ2 on the generated mutants also reassures us about the correct implementation of our
operators. Hence, in RQ2, FindBugs could identify 70% of the vulnerabilities generated and a
custom-made security test-suite was able to kill all the (non equivalent) mutants.
Construct validity
In RQ1, we choose iTrust to perform the experiment because of the high diversity of security
concerns that the application should consider, inherently to its web application nature. This
feeling is also confirmed in table 5.4 as a higher percentage of classes (8%) are mutated in
iTrust, compared to the other considered projects. RQ2 ’s only purpose was to verify our
operators’ implementation. Following this idea, we mutated on average one custom-made class
per operator, specifically implemented to trigger a corresponding mutation operator. We defend
that this validation is sufficient for RQ2’s goal. For RQ3, we performed our experimentation on
2 web applications and 2 Bit torrent clients. In future work, we aim at repeating the experiment,
and increase the diversity and the number of projects to confirm the results we obtained. In
RQ4, we chose iTrust because of the availability and the high coverage of its test cases (≈94%).
The coverage was calculated using EclEmma’s coverage plugin6 for eclipse.
6http://www.eclemma.org
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External validity
We took inspiration on patterns identified and documented by FindBugs sec plugin. It could
be questionable whether the proposed patterns could be found in practice. Nevertheless, every
pattern defined in the plugin relies on real vulnerability occurrences described in well-known
reporting authorities (NIST, CVE), as stated in the plugin’s documentation7. However, a high
percentage of cyber-security incidents are caused by the exploitation of known vulnerabilities
[47]. In our evaluations, we selected four open source projects that should be highly concerned
by security issues, inherently to their nature (Web Applications and Bit torrent clients).
7http://find-sec-bugs.github.io/bugs.htm
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Chapter 6
Conclusion & Perspectives
This thesis introduces security-aware mutation testing operators. Inspired by common vulnera-
bility patterns, we have designed 15 new mutation operators for JAVA, which we implement in
the mutation testing engine of PIT. We used FindBugs and its security plugin to assess whether
standard PIT mutation operators are likely to introduce vulnerabilities, like those supported
by our operators, and demonstrated that they fail to do so. Our case studies validated the
purposes of our operators and revealed that certain types of vulnerabilities are prevalent in
open source projects.
This work constitutes the first step towards a relatively new direction of mutation testing
research which is the mutation-based security testing. Moreover, the major conclusions of the
work we present in this thesis were published [20] in Mutation2017, an international workshop
that aims at discussing new and emerging trends in mutation analysis. With the use of our
mutants, security related test suites can be designed and documented. Other potential uses of
our mutation operators are in education and in the systematic evaluation and comparison of
fuzzing and other security testing tools. Overall, our goal is to use mutation to define adequacy
criteria for security testing. Moreover, in the next lines, we state the potential benefits of our
approach in the security testing techniques that we presented in chapter 2.
Code based techniques and static analysis: First, the potential of our technique may
be easily highlighted in the education of security testers. Hence, our technique, in the way
of the Metasploit framework1, gathers a database of real-world vulnerabilities. Therefore, our
mutation operators may be valuable in educating the security testers by providing potential
vulnerability patterns but also by providing a correction for each of these patterns. Following
1Metasploit Pen Testing Tool is an open-source project that gathers information’s on vulnerabilities that may
be found in real-world projects. Doing so, it aims at helping penetration testing.
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the same idea, the patterns we collect, considering future improvement, may form an effective
database to include in the Code-Based security testing techniques.
Dynamic security testing tools and techniques: Next, the operators may also be used
for generating vulnerabilities in real world projects. Here, the benefits we imagine lie in the
evaluation of security tools and/or techniques. Hence, one could compare vulnerability scan-
ners, fuzzers, or other dynamic security testing techniques by using our operators to generate
vulnerable versions of a software and see which technique is capable of discovering the most
vulnerabilities.
Regression security testing: Finally, we also consider the applicability of the new opera-
tors but also of the extended tool in the creation of security regression test suites. Hence, each
operator illustrates the usage of a secured feature in the current code of the application and
forces the tester to cover the case where the secured feature would be missing. Therefore, if one
removes one of these secured features during the maintenance phase, the regression test suite
will immediately alert the mistaking programmer. We strongly believe that this statement
forms the major impact of our research as we could not find, to the best of our knowledge,
another mutation based security testing technique covering this issue.
In the future, we plan to extend our work towards the following directions: First, we plan
to consider a much larger set of security patterns that we will mine from open source projects.
Second, we will assess our research questions on more subjects and confirm our observations
with actual tests from fuzzing tools. Third, we would like thoroughly assess the practical
benefits of our security testing metrics.
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Abstract—Mutation analysis forms a popular software analysis
technique that has been demonstrated to be useful in supporting
multiple software engineering activities. Yet, the use of mutation
analysis in tackling security issues has received little attention.
In view of this, we design security aware mutation operators to
support mutation analysis. Using a known set of common security
vulnerability patterns, we introduce 15 security-aware mutation
operators for Java. We then implement them in the PIT mutation
engine and evaluate them. Our preliminary results demonstrate
that standard PIT operators are unlikely to introduce vulner-
abilities similar to ours. We also show that our security-aware
mutation operators are indeed applicable and prevalent on open
source projects, providing evidence that mutation analysis can
support security testing activities.
Keywords-Mutation analysis; Mutation operators; Security
Testing; PIT; FindBugs
I. INTRODUCTION
Mutation testing is a popular fault-based testing technique
[1], [2]. As every fault-based technique, it provides guarantees
that the software under analysis is free from specific types
of faults [3]. The technique has attracted a lot of interest
because it forms a flexible and effective way to perform
testing. Thus, it is used to guide test generation [4], to
perform test assessment [5] and to uncover subtle faults [6].
It works by making syntactically altered program versions of
the system under test. These alterations are designed to reflect
the faults that our testing seeks for and are used for assessing
the adequacy of testing. The approach is flexible because it
relies on the introduced alterations [2]. Thus, by designing
appropriate mutations it is possible to test all structures of
a given language and almost everything that testing process
seeks for. In view of this, we design security aware mutations
that can be used to guide the testing of security related issues.
Taking advantage of the fault-based nature of the technique,
our mutations ensure that security-aware faults are not present
and through regression tests that these will not appear in
the future when the software will evolve. Existing mutation
operators, especially those used by the Java mutation testing
tools [7] are restricted to simple syntactic alterations and faults.
Hence, it is unlikely that they can lead to tests that effectively
exercise security related aspects of the applications. To deal
with this issue, we design security-aware mutations based on
common security bug patterns encoded by a well-known static
analysis tool called FindBugs-sec-plugin1 [8]. The bug patterns
1Find Security Bugs is a plugin for FindBugs and aims at identifying
security issues in Java web applications.
used by the static analysis tools aim at identifying potential
issues with the code under analysis. Therefore, they point-
out the presence of potential bugs and not opportunities for
injecting them as it is done by the mutation operators. To
cover this last point and design our security-aware mutations,
we manually analyzed the bug patterns, inferred the classes
of faults they represent and inverted them, i.e., we defined
rules that introduce these defects. We have implemented our
mutations on PIT mutation testing engine [9] and provide ini-
tial exploratory results showing its applicability and difference
from the traditional mutation operators. Thus, we applied both
the traditional and our operators on four subject programs
and validated the presence of potential vulnerabilities using
FindBugs. Our results demonstrate that traditional operators
are ineffective in introducing such security-aware faults.
Overall, our security related faults represent simple vulner-
abilities, which can form an initial step for defining security-
aware testing requirements. We believe that these require-
ments are particularly useful when building regression test
suites of web application. Furthermore, our operators can be
particularly useful in evaluating and comparing fuzzing or
other security testing tools. In summary, our paper makes the
following contributions:
1) We design 15 security-aware mutation operators for sup-
porting security mutation testing.
2) We extend PIT so that it applies both traditional and
security-aware mutation testing. To support future re-
search, we make our implementation publicly available.
3) We make an initial assessment of our operators demon-
strating their prevalence and potential weaknesses of the
traditional operators using large real-world projects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections II
and III presents operator definition process and detail our
security-aware operators. Section IV describes our assessment
and results. Sections V and VI discus threats to validity and
related work. Finally Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MUTATION OPERATORS DEFINITION PROCEDURE
Security related issues have received little attention by the
mutation testing literature. As a result, it lacks operators that
introduce security bugs. While security bugs are more or less
well understood, there is no clear definition that we could use.
Therefore, for the purposes of this study we use the following
definition: a security bug is a piece of code that can lead to
one or several vulnerabilities in an application.
TABLE I: Security-aware Mutation Operators
Acronym Name
UPPRNG USE PREDICTABLE PSEUDO RAND NUM GEN
RPTS REMOVE PATH TRAVERSAL SANITIZATION
UWMD USE WEAK MESSAGE DIGEST
RHNV REMOVE HOST NAME VERIFICATION
XMLPVXXE XML PARSER VULNERABLE TO XXE
XMLPVXEE XML PARSER VULNERABLE TO XEE
REIS REMOVE ENCRYPTION IN SOCKET
UC UNSECURE COOKIE
RHTTPOFC REMOVE HTTPONLY FROM COOKIE
URSAWSK USE RSA WITH SHORT KEY
UBFWSK USE BLOWFISH WITH SHORT KEY
PSQLI PERMIT SQL INJECTION
UDESISE USE DES IN SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
UECBISE USE ECB IN SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
RRS REMOVE REGEX SANITIZATION
Research on software security developed a number of tech-
niques to identify vulnerabilities in source code. One such
(effective) technique is based on static analysis and seeks to
identify occurrences of problematic code patterns. Such tools
detect security bugs by highlighting potentially vulnerable
code based on common vulnerability patterns. In view of
this, we propose to leverage their knowledge and gather a set
of common security bugs, which we can turn into injectable
faults. These faults can form our mutants and support security
testing.
By gathering the security patterns supported by known static
analysis tools we can identify certain types of security related
faults. Unfortunately, these patterns only detect the presence
of a potentially vulnerable code and not the transformation
needed to inject a vulnerability. Indeed, a security mutation
operator can identify a non-vulnerable code pattern and turn
it into a vulnerable one. We transformed every occurrence
of the vulnerability patterns in its non-vulnerable functional
equivalent one in order to define our mutation operators. This
was not a trivial task as it required manual analysis and
comprehension of the vulnerability classes.
For the purposes of the present study, we used the security
patterns of a well-known static security bug analyzer, named
FindBugs-sec plugin. All the patterns we used are described in
the plugin documentation [8]. We believe that these patterns
are suitable for our purposes as most of them form real-world
security bugs that are well justified by Findbugs-sec, with CVE
and NIST references. We detail our operators in the following
Section.
III. SECURITY-AWARE MUTATION OPERATORS
Table I presents the acronyms and a short description
of our mutation operators. For each operator, we provide
its application context, its goal, and some implementation
details, i.e., how it proceeds to introduce a vulnerability in
the application under test.
Use predictable pseudo random number generator
(UPPRNG). Context: Pseudo Random Number Generators
(PRNGs) are widely used in secure-aware contexts and es-
pecially in cryptography to avoid prediction that could ease
undesired decryption. Goal: the UPPRNG operator tries to
make the application vulnerable to predictable random num-
ber generator attacks potentially leading to various security
leaks (authentication, authorization, etc.). Implementation: this
operator replaces the unpredictable pseudo random generators
from the SecureRandom class by predictable ones using the
Random class.
Remove path traversal sanitization (RPTS). Context: web
applications often provide internal file access functionalities
to their external users by requiring them to provide the
desired file’s name. Goal: the RPTS operator introduces a
vulnerability which allows a malicious user to enter a path to
access directories or files regardless of the file access policy
defined by the web application. Implementation: the operator
simply removes calls to input file names sanitization functions,
generally used to avoid this vulnerability.
Use weak message digest (UWMD). Context: message
digests, or hashing functions, are very often used to assure the
integrity of received data. However, some hash functions are
weak because of their high collision degree: in this case, for a
hashed string, a malicious user can easily craft another string
producing the same hash. Goal: the UWMD operator introduces
a vulnerability in integrity checking of received data by using
a weak hash function (i.e., MD5). Implementation: it identifies
hash function calls and replaces them by MD5 hashing.
Remove host name verification (RHNV). Context: a web
application needing to authenticate its clients may verify their
host names, usually after a successful SSL handshake. Goal:
the RHNV operator removes this authentication, making the
application vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Imple-
mentation: it removes standard methods used to authenticate
clients using their host names.
Make XML parser vulnerable to XML Entity Expansion
attack (XMLPVXEE). Context: web services often parse
XML documents, to communicate with other web services in a
standardized way. A known attack is the billion laughs attack
which is an instance of a denial of service attack on XML
parsers that require them to exponentially expand the tree with
dummy text (“LOL”). However, one can prevent this attack
by enabling a standard security option on the XML parser.
Goal: the XMLPVXEE operator introduces a vulnerability in
external XML parsers to expose the application to DOS at-
tacks. Implementation: the operator disables standard security
options of the XML parsers just before the XML parser begins
parsing. It performs this task by identifying methods used on
standard XML Java parsers, like XMLReader or SAXParser
instances.
Make XML parser vulnerable to XML eXternal Entity
attack (XMLPVXXE). Context: for this operator, in addition
to the XML document parsing feature, we also assume that
the attacker has a way to access the result of the parsing.
In this context, an XML eXternal Entity (XXE) attack can
lead to a confidentiality leak by accessing unauthorized files.
To prevent this attack, developers have to enable a standard
security option on their XML parsers. Goal: the XMLPVXXE
operator introduces a vulnerability in external XML parsers
to expose the application to XXE attacks. Implementation: it
disables standard XXE security option of the XML parsers
before an XML parsing. Like the XMLPVXEE operator, the
XMLPVXXE operator performs this by identifying methods
used on standard XML Java parsers.
Remove encryption in socket (REIS). Context: it is
very usual in web applications to exchange encrypted data
(i.e, passwords, e-mail addresses, etc.) with a user. This is
commonly done by using sockets encrypting data with SSL on
HTTP. Goal: the REIS operator tries to weaken the applica-
tion’s sent data to expose it to a confidentiality leak. Implemen-
tation: it removes the SSL encryption in sockets by identifying
and removing standard Java SSL-encryption. For instance, it
can replace sockets created with a SSLSocketFactory by
sockets created with a SocketFactory.
Unsecure cookie (UC). Context: cookies are defined by
the HTTP protocol as pieces of information sent by the server
to the client’s browser. Some cookies can store secret values
proving the authentication of the client and must therefore
be encrypted using SSL during communication. Cookies are
meant to be sent by the browser with each request from the
client, disregarding the secured-nature of the communication.
To make sure that a browser will not make the mistake of send-
ing a sensitive cookie in an unsecured HTTP communication, a
secure flag can be set on the cookie, asking the browser to send
this cookie only during HTTPS communications. Goal: the
UC operator allows to send sensitive cookies during unsecured
HTTP communication. Implementation: it removes the call to
the methods setting the secure flag on cookies.
Remove HTTP-only flag from cookie (RHTTPOFC).
Context: even if a cookie was sent using an HTTPS commu-
nication, web pages’ scripts can access it on the client-side by
asking the browser concrete access to the session’s cookies. An
attacker may access those cookies on the client-side by using
a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. To prevent this, cookies
have an HttpOnly flag asking the client’s browser to not share
this cookie with scripts. Of course, the flag is just mitigating
the risk, since it relies on the trust in the browser. Goal: The
RHTTPOFC operator exposes the web pages to such session’s
cookies confidentiality leaks. Implementation: It removes the
call of standard methods setting the httpOnly flag on cookies,
allowing to share the cookie with client-side scripts.
Use RSA with short key (URSAWSK). Context: RSA is an
asymmetric encryption algorithm used in web applications to
exchange confidential data. Over time, with the improvement
of computation power, the RSA algorithm needs longer keys to
keep the exchange secured and to resist to brute force attacks.
NIST2 recommends the RSA keys to be at least 2048 bits long.
Goal: the URSAWSK operator tries to weaken RSA encryption
to make brute force attacks possible, allowing confidential data
to leak. Implementation: it detects the use of RSA encryption
with a sufficient key size and sets its to 512 bits.
2http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
131Ar1.pdf
Use Blowfish with short key (UBFWSK). Context: Blow-
fish is a variable key size symmetric encryption algorithm five
times faster than triple DES. Just like RSA, Blowfish could
also be used with a short key (less than 128 bits). Goal:
The UBFWSK operator tries to weaken Blowfish encryption to
expose the application to brute force attacks, also allowing data
to confidentiality leaks. Implementation: When the operator
detects the usage of Blowfish with a sufficient key size, it sets
the key size to 64 bits.
Permit SQL injection (PSQLI). Context: SQL injections
exploit the fact that the web application uses input(s) from
the user to build an SQL query that will be executed by a
Data Base Management System (DBMS). The idea for an
attacker is to inject SQL code in the input used to build the
query in order to maliciously alter the database and or get
access to private information. To prevent these attacks, Java
APIs provide methods to prepare/encode queries and send
them without their external inputs to the DBMS, requiring
these inputs separately from the user. Inputs are then used
to finalize construction of the query and execute it. Hence,
it is not possible anymore for an attacker to play with
the SQL-syntax to create tainted queries. Goal: the PSQLI
operator tries to weaken the web application’s protection
against SQL-injection attacks to expose it to various security
leaks potentially threatening its confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication mechanisms. Implementation: it detects usages
of SQL injection-proof APIs and replaces such usages by
unsecured APIs in order to execute SQL queries.
Use DES in symmetric encryption (UDESISE). Context:
in secured web applications, symmetric encryption is often
very valuable to exchange sensitive data with external users.
Data Encryption Standard (DES) was a popular symmetric en-
cryption algorithm recognized as now sensitive to brute force
attacks due to the great advances in computer performances.
Therefore, web applications should prefer other symmetric en-
cryption algorithms, like AES. Goal: the idea of the UDESISE
operator is to weaken the confidentiality of symmetrically
encrypted data, exposing it to leaks. Implementation: it detects
the usage of a symmetric encryption algorithm and replaces
it with DES encryption. This operator requires to modify
several Java code lines. Though, PIT’s architecture wasn’t
designed for this kind of modifications. Therefore, UDESISE
is still under review but our initial implementation provides
promising results.
Use ECB in symmetric encryption (UECBISE). Context:
symmetric encryption may be done using different modes,
describing how the algorithm should encrypt a message, which
is split into blocks of fixed size. The Electronic CodeBook
(ECB) mode encrypts two identical blocks into two identical
ciphered blocks, introducing redundancy in the encrypted
message, which makes it easier for an attacker to decrypt the
message. Goal: the UECBISE operator tries to weaken the
confidentiality of symmetrically encrypted data by easing its
decryption using ECB mode. Implementation: it detects the
usage of a symmetric encryption algorithm and replaces its
mode by ECB.
Remove regex sanitization (RRS). Context: modern web-
sites are following the idea of WEB 2.0, enabling the participa-
tion of external users to the content of a web page. Thus, web
applications can have a lot of stored data coming from external
users. To prevent malicious users’ content, web applications
commonly validate the inputs coming from external sources
using regular expressions. Goal: the RRS operator tries to
introduce vulnerabilities in external input filters of a web
application. Implementation: it detects regular expressions
usages and replace them by a dummy expression, which is
always true.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we report on our preliminary efforts to assess
the relevance our set of security-aware mutation operators. To
this end, we state three research questions: (RQ1) Are the
standard operators of PIT likely to introduce vulnerabilities?
(RQ2) Does our mutation operators introduce vulnerabilities
that are detectable by the FindBugs’ static analysis? (RQ3)
How prevalent is the application of our mutation operators on
open source projects?
Case Studies
In order to answer the different research questions, we
considered the following case studies:
1) iTrust: iTrust3 is a web application developed and main-
tained by the students of NCState University and consists of
24,785 lines of code. It provides a platform accessible to
patients and doctors, to keep track of the patient’s medical
history.
2) Vuze-Azureus: Vuze4 is a popular open-source Bittorrent
client, consisting of 186,247 lines of code.
3) OpenLegislation: OpenLegislation5 is an open source
web application developed and maintained by the New York
State Senate. The goal of this application is to give access
to several NYS’s data including bills, resolutions and laws. It
consists of 912 classes and is 33,819 lines of code.
4) AntsP2P: Ant’s Peer-to-Peer is an open-source Bittor-
rent client6 (consisting of 19,399 lines of code), like Vuze.
RQ1: PIT Operators and Vulnerabilities
To investigate this question, we generate mutants using
PIT’s standard mutation operators and use FindBugs to count
the vulnerabilities found. This metric gives an indication of
the suitability of such operators to cover vulnerabilities even
if they are not designed for that. We selected the iTrust case for
this assessment: we elicited a sample of 33 classes, for which
our security-aware operators yielded vulnerabilities found by
FindBugs, and applied PIT on those classes. Table II records
our results.
Overall, PIT generated 5486 mutants and introduced only
two vulnerabilities (see Table II). The introduced vulnerabili-
ties relate to potential SQL injection attacks that can occur by
3https://sourceforge.net/projects/itrust/ (version 21.0.01)
4https://sourceforge.net/projects/azureus/ (version 5.7.40)
5https://github.com/nysenate/OpenLegislation (version 2.2)
6https://sourceforge.net/projects/antsp2p/ (version beta1.6.0)
TABLE II: Mutating iTrust with PIT’s standart operator set.
The table records the number of mutants and vulnerabilities
that were generated per used operator.
Operator name #mutants #Vulnerabilities
ArgumentPropagationMutator 42 0
ConditionalsBoundaryMutator 48 0
ConstructorCallMutator 431 0
IncrementsMutator 12 0
InlineConstantMutator 696 0
MathMutator 41 0
MemberVariableMutator 83 0
NegateConditionalsMutator 368 0
NonVoidMethodCallMutator 1539 1
RemoveConditionalMutator EQUAL ELSE 320 0
RemoveConditionalMutator EQUAL IF 320 0
RemoveConditionalMutator ORDER ELSE 48 0
RemoveConditionalMutator ORDER IF 48 1
RemoveIncrementsMutator 12 0
RemoveSwitchMutator 15 0
ReturnValsMutator 289 0
SwitchMutator 2 0
VoidMethodCallMutator 1172 0
Total 5486 2
inserting dynamically generated strings in a query (SQL_-
NONCONSTANT_STRING_PASSED_TO_EXECUTE) or by
removing a conditional execution (SQL_INJECTION_-
JDBC). Though these are genuine security issues, this harvest
with standard operators appears to be mediocre. As we will see
in the following sections, our operators are able to introduce
a much larger number of vulnerabilities (62 for iTrust).
RQ2: Static detection of Vulnerabilities
Our second research question investigates the extend to
which our security-aware operators introduce vulnerabilities
and if they are always detectable statically with FindBugs. This
process can be seen as a sanity check of the function of the
implemented operators. To perform this check, we manually
created a sample project containing on average one class that
contains one application instance of the mutation operators
we implemented. Each class was implemented so that it can
trigger one specific mutation. We used PIT’s mutation engine
to generate the mutants with respect to our operators. We
wrote scripts to keep track of the applied mutations and results
obtained via FindBugs. We specifically tuned FindBugs to
check every potential issue, even those of low confidence, at
the cost of performance.
The analysis results are reported in Table III. RRS and
UDESISE were not evaluated. RRS was not inspired by a
FindBugs pattern. Regarding UDESISE, it requires higher or-
der mutation and its correct operation is currently experimental
in PIT. Overall, we can see that 9/13 (nearly 70%) operators
generated a vulnerability that could be found by FindBugs.
For the four remaining ones, non-recognition causes are:
a) Remove Host Name Verification (RHNV): the vul-
nerability is actually introduced, because the replacement
of HostNameVerifier.verify(...)’s result by true
was present in the mutant. It is not recognized be-
cause FindBugs identifies a vulnerable HostNameVerifier by
TABLE III: Injected classes of vulnerabilities that were iden-
tified by FindBugs (with the security plugin), in a sample
project. We mutated this project and verified the presence of
vulnerabilities by comparing the static analysis reports of the
mutants and the original programs. Y signifies that the injected
vulnerability was identified by FindBugs.
UPPRNG RPTS UWMD RHNV XMLPVXXE
Recognized? Y Y Y N N
XMLPVXEE REIS UC RHTTPOFC URSAWSK
Recognized? N N Y Y Y
UBFWSK PSQLI UDESISE UECBISE RRS
Recognized? Y Y / Y /
looking at its code. Indeed, for FindBugs, a vulnerable
HostNameVerifier is identified by a constant return
true; in all its .verify(...) methods. Because we
didn’t mutate the HostNameVerifier.verify(...)
method but its calls, FindBugs could thus not recognize it.
b) Xml Parser Vunerable to XXE/XEE (XMLPVXXE/
XMLPVXEE): the vulnerability is also present as we remove
a secure parsing feature of the XML reader. However, we
mutated a secure original program that had the following line:
XMLReader.setFeature(SecurizingFeature,
true) prior to parsing. Therefore, the mutant had the
following code:
XMLReader . s e t F e a t u r e ( S e c u r i z i n g F e a t u r e ,
t rue ) ;
XMLReader . s e t F e a t u r e ( S e c u r i z i n g F e a t u r e ,
f a l s e ) ;
XMLReader . p a r s e ( i n p u t ) ;
We hypothesize that when FindBugs analysed the first line, it
directly returned that the vulnerability was eliminated.
c) Remove Encryption In Socket (REIS): here, after per-
forming several tests, we supposed that FindBugs identifies
unsecured sockets only by the following pattern:
So ck e t s = new So c k e t ( a d d r e s s , p o r t ) ;
However, since we created a unsecured socket in the mutant
with the following method:
So ck e t s = S o c k e t F a c t o r y . g e t D e f a u l t ( ) .
c r e a t e S o c k e t ( a d d r e s s , p o r t ) ;
and upon manual inspection of createSocket(...)
method’s specification, we certify that the two manners of
creating an unsecured socket are equivalent.
Regarding the results of this section, we can answer RQ2
by stating that all vulnerabilities were actually introduced
though only 70% were found by FindBugs. Missed vulner-
abilities either stem from the static analyzer’s incomplete-
ness (REIS) or optimisations (XMLPVXXE/XMLPVXEE).
Regarding RHNV, this vulnerability requires a global (e.g.,
analysing the call graph) or a dynamic reasoning, techniques
that are out of reach for FindBugs. Although we took inspi-
ration on FindBugs patterns to create our mutation operators,
they can trick FindBugs. Therefore, our operators might be
used to validate static analysis tools as well.
TABLE IV: Mutating projects with new operators
iTrust VUZE OPENLEGISLATION ANTSP2P
#classes in input 405 4669 912 406
#classes mutated 33 30 57 9
#mutants generated 62 57 154 18
TABLE V: Number of security-aware mutants generated on
4 open source projects. The table entries record the number
of mutants generated per mutation operator and project. Non
referenced operators did not produce any mutants.
UPPRNG UWMD PSQLI UECBISE RRS TOTAL
iTrust 1 0 39 0 22 62
VUZE 8 2 0 9 38 57
OPENLEGISLATION 0 0 0 0 154 154
ANTSP2P 2 4 0 11 1 18
RQ3: Prevalence of Security-aware Operators’ application
The preceding research questions were meant to assess the
relevance of our security-aware operators. However, the ques-
tion that it is raised here is how numerous these vulnerabilities
are. In practice, it is hard to trigger and secure vulnerabilities
and thus, it is possible that injecting a large number of them
may be excessively expensive. To assess this point, we simply
generated mutants with our operators for the four projects we
considered. Table IV records the results provided by our 15
operators.
A first observation is that five of our operators are prevalent
in practice. Interestingly, these operators are not numerous
indicating that mutation-based security testing is feasible. Ten
operators were not applicable in the selected projects.
Another interesting point is that the injected faults only
concern a fraction of the project’s classes (e.g., 0.67% for
VUZE). Table V shows the repartition of applied operators
for each project. There are disparities, PSQLI that accounts
for 61% of the mutants in iTrust and does not appear in other
projects, while RRS appears in all projects. RRS “popularity”
is also quite understandable as a regex-sanitization function
can be assumed to be more common to web applications than
the use of Blowfish, for instance. We therefore conclude
that many security-aware faults appear in the selected projects.
Though, we note that further case studies are required to gain
confidence on the prevalence of our operators.
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Internal validity. One possible threat of our study is due to
the used tools. We implemented our operators in PIT, which re-
lies on Java bytecode manipulation (using ASM Java bytecode
framework as an abstraction layer) to perform mutations. Thus,
potential defects may influence our results. To verify that our
operators were correctly implemented, we used code review
on the operators’ implementation, and, for each experiment,
we manually inspected the generated mutants. Moreover, we
checked in RQ2 that the vulnerabilities from the generated
mutants are detected by FindBugs: it is the case for nine of
them, explanations for the four remaining ones are given in
Section IV.
Construct validity. We chose to use iTrust to answer RQ1,
because of the high number of security concerns that the
application has to take into account. This tends to be confirmed
by the higher percentage (8%) of classes mutated by our new
operators in Table IV. RQ2’s only goal was to validate our
operators’ implementation. Therefore, we used ad hoc classes,
one per operator, which is enough for this purpose. For RQ3,
we took 4 open source projects: 2 web applications and 2
Bittorrent clients. We plan to extend the number as well as
the diversity of the considered projects in our future work.
External validity. We designed our mutation operators,
based on patterns defined in FindBugs sec plugin. Therefore,
it is questionable whether these are usually met in practice.
However, each of these patterns introduces one or more
vulnerabilities described in well-known vulnerability reporting
authorities (like NIST and CVE), as referenced in FindBugs
documentation7. To perform our evaluation, we selected 4
open source projects in which security is a key concern.
VI. RELATED WORK
Using mutation for security purposes was explored at the
model-level by Mouehli et al. [10] where the authors mutate
access control models to qualify security test suites. Operators
change user roles and allowed actions, deleting policy rules
or modify their application context. Dadeau et al. defined
operators that introduce leaks in a high-level security procotol
[11]. Bu¨chler et al. considered mutating the abstract model
of a web application by removing authorization checks and
un-sanitizing data [12], but they do not detail the operators.
Although, these operators are inspired from actual vulnerabil-
ities, as being model-based they model different defects from
our code-based ones.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no set of security-
aware mutation operators for Java. Perhaps the closest related
work is that of Nanavati et al. [13], Shahriar and Zulkernine
[14] and Ghosh et al. [15] that defined mutation operators
related to the memory related faults. All these operators
introduces memory manipulation issues in C programs (such
buffer overflows, uninitialized memory allocations and etc.),
which may be exploited by security attacks. As these operators
make heavy use of memory allocation primitives, specific to
the C language, they are rather different from ours.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces security-aware mutation testing op-
erators. Inspired by common vulnerability patterns, we have
designed 15 new mutation operators for Java, which we
implement in the mutation testing engine of PIT. We used
FindBugs and its security plugin to assess whether standard
PIT mutation operators are likely to introduce vulnerabilities,
like those supported by our operators, and demonstrated that
they fail to do so. Our case studies validated the purposes of
our operators and revealed that certain types of vulnerabilities
are prevalent in open source projects.
7http://find-sec-bugs.github.io/bugs.htm
This work constitutes the first step towards a relatively new
direction of mutation testing research which is the mutation-
based security testing. With the use of our mutants, security
related test suites can be designed and documented. Other
potential uses of our mutation operators are in education and in
the systematic evaluation and comparison of fuzzing and other
security testing tools. Overall, our goal is to use mutation to
define adequacy criteria for security testing.
In the future, we plan to extend our work towards the
following directions: First, we plan to consider a much larger
set of security patterns that we will mine from open source
projects. Second, we will assess our research questions on
more subjects and confirm our observations with actual tests
from fuzzing tools. Third, we would like thoroughly assess
the practical benefits of our security testing metrics.
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